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4.1 Introduction
During the postwar period, the total tax yield in Sweden increased
dramatically from 25 percent of GNP in 1955 to 50 percent in 1979. As
shown in table 4.1, this increase was accompanied by substantial changes
in the tax structure. Social security contributions, mainly by employers,
accounted for roughly half of the twenty-five percentage point increase,
thereby raising employers' share of total tax receipts more than tenfold.
The share of taxes on personal incomes and corporate profits, on the
other hand, fell markedly.
The structural changes in the tax system, apparent from table 4.1,
reflect the growth of the public sector and a marked shift in the direction
of fiscal policy from the 1950s to the 1970s. The large devaluation of the
Swedish crown in 1949 greatly improved the international competitive-
ness of Swedish industry. Through moderate wage increases the favor-
able relative cost position was preserved for more than a decade, making
the 1950s a period of high rates of profit and steadily expanding business
investment. In this situation, stabilization policy during periods of excess
demand was directed mainly at containing private investment. The statu-
tory corporate tax rate was raised, and free depreciation allowances for
machinery and equipment were gradually phased out. The rules of inven-
tory valuation were tightened, and in two instances, in 1952-53 and
1955-57, special investment taxes were introduced to reduce the rate of
private capital formation.
Toward the end of the 1950s this type of fiscal policy was abandoned as
economic growth became a more central economic objective. Several
changes in the tax system shifted the burden of the stabilization mecha-
nism from corporate investment to private consumption. The system of














t~- so fN oo i—i r^ N H oo Mn m
os os in in oo en
(N OS O (N o in (N i-»
*—i m <N «—i
in ro
OS 00
O oc oo Tf o oq rn
CN 00 T-H T-H O >-< O
<N C C C C
• O O Os 00



















_ i !« O Bl
23 O <u «->
a 3 <L> -a rz P ,c
O Cl. D-
c 8 "B





was raised through a general sales tax in 1960 as well as a new payroll tax
for social security. As a result, the budget surplus increased dramatically.
With the emergence of balance-of-payments deficits from the mid-
1960s, expansion of industrial investment received greater emphasis in
policymaking. There was a liberalization of the rules for fiscal deprecia-
tion and also a more frequent use of the special Swedish scheme of
subsidizing investment—that is, the investment funds system (described
in detail in section 4.2.5). In addition, the investment tax component of
commodity taxation was abolished when the general sales tax was re-
placed by a value-added tax in 1969.
The external imbalances, which first arose in the mid-1960s, were much
aggravated by the oil crises a decade later. The problem was further
worsened by the rapid wage increases and the exchange rate policies of
the second half of the 1970s. The long-term policy for eliminating the
balance-of-payments deficit has remained one of promoting industrial
growth. This has meant, for example, that firms during the second half of
the 1970s and the early 1980s have been able to count on using their
investment funds almost continuously for new investment. Several kinds
of ad hoc measures, such as extra investment allowances, have also been
used to stimulate investment. Other recent changes in the tax system
include further mitigation of the double taxation of dividends and special
tax concessions to household savings.
In the past twenty years there have been major changes in the redis-
tributive role of the Swedish tax system. During the 1960s interest in
economic growth gave way to concern about income distribution. The
individual income tax became more progressive after the mid-1960s. A
major reform of the income tax was enacted in 1971, involving, among
other things, a shift from joint to individual taxation of spouses. The
reform resulted in a marked increase in progressivity combined with the
abolition of the deduction allowed for the local government income tax.
The latter meant that an increase in local income tax no longer automati-
cally implied a reduction of national income tax liability. As a result,
effective marginal tax rates rose.
The enhanced progressivity built into the tax schedule by the reform of
1971 and the simultaneous rapid increases in local income tax rates and,
in particular, of high rates of inflation caused a "marginal tax problem"
for the rest of the 1970s. To secure a given increase in real after-tax
earnings, it was necessary to ask for large increases in nominal pretax
wages. During the early 1970s the government attempted to solve this
problem by annual ad hoc adjustments to the taxation of earned income,
carried out before the rounds of central collective bargaining. These
adjustments, which involved reductions in income tax and increases in
the payroll tax, made possible increases in real after-tax earnings at rates
acceptable to the largest groups of wage earners. At the same time, the90 Sweden
tax adjustments were designed to achieve a further redistribution of
income. (For a discussion of this period, see Normann 1978, 1981).
The policy of making annual ad hoc adjustments to the tax schedule
was changed in 1979 as part of the new tax policy of the nonsocialist
government that came into power in 1976. The income tax schedules
were indexed to the consumer price index. In addition, some small steps
were taken toward a lowering of marginal tax rates.
The beginning of the 1980s witnessed some important changes in
attitudes, with a growing concern about possible detrimental effects of
high marginal tax rates. More emphasis was placed on efficiency and
incentives and less on the goal of an equitable distribution of income. A
manifestation of this was the agreement in April 1981 between two of the
three parties in the nonsocialist coalition government and the opposition
Social Democratic party to a major reform of personal income taxation.
The reform, enacted by Parliament in June 1982, is scheduled to be fully
implemented by 1985, after a two-year phase-in period. It is designed to
cut marginal income tax rates for the majority of full-time wage earners to
a maximum of 50 percent, while simultaneously lowering the value of
interest deductions for earners in the higher marginal rate brackets to 50
percent (see section 4.2.1 for a more detailed account of this tax reform).
4.2 The Tax System
4.2.1 The Personal Income Tax
The personal income tax in Sweden consists of two parts: a flat-rate
local income tax and a progressive central government income tax. Local
and national income taxes are assessed on similar bases. Before the tax
reform of 1971, however, local income tax payments were deductible
from the base of the national income tax.
An important feature of the reform of 1971 was the change from joint
to individual taxation of spouses. Individual taxation applies to so called
A-income, that is, income from wages and salaries, farms, and unin-
corporated businesses. Income from other sources—for example invest-
ment income, which is labeled B-income—is, however, still taxed jointly
beyond a certain amount—at present 2,000 Swedish crowns (SEK).
For the calculations of taxable income, several kinds of deductions may
be made. First, all individuals are entitled to a basic deduction. During
the second half of the 1970s this deduction amounted to 4,500 SEK, but
the rules have recently been changed. The basic deduction is now con-
fined to local income taxation, and the amount has been raised to 6,000
SEK. Households with children are entitled to an "employment deduc-
tion," which means that the secondary worker of the family may deduct
25 percent of his or her earned income up to a maximum of 2,000 SEK.91 The Tax System
Single persons with children are allowed the same deduction. We note,
finally, a minor remnant of the old system of joint taxation of spouses. A
household with only one income earner is granted a credit against the
income tax liability of 1,800 SEK.
As already pointed out, investment income in Sweden is regarded as
B-income and is taxed on a joint basis if over 2,000 SEK. B-income is
added to the income of the primary (highest) income earner and taxed
according to her or his marginal rate of income tax. (Note, however, that
the first 4,500 SEK of income of each spouse is treated as A-income,
regardless of source. As explained, A-income is taxed individually.)
Swedish tax laws exempt a limited amount of investment income from
tax. In 1980 this tax-free amount was 1,600 SEK for a married couple and
800 SEK for a single person. Apart from this, the tax rules are symmetri-
cal in the sense that interest payments are deductible with no upper limit.
As a result of the tax reform due to be implemented by 1985, this
principle of symmetry will be broken for high-income earners. Techni-
cally this will be accomplished by dividing the national income tax into
two parts, the basic tax and the supplementary tax. The tax base for the
basic tax will be determined according to existing rules, which include in
the base net investment income and net income from homeownership
(usually a negative amount after deductions for mortgage interest). The
marginal tax rate rises to a maximum of 20 percent at an income of 64,000
SEK in 1981 prices. The base of the supplementary tax is defined dif-
ferently in one important respect, namely that negative net investment
income and negative income from homeownership may not be used as an
offset against wage income. The marginal tax rates for the supplementary
tax run from zero at 102,400 SEK to a maximum of 30 percent at 288,000
SEK (in 1981 prices).
During the past few years, the tax base has been further eroded by
some concessions to specific forms of household savings. Savings in
special bank accounts (with an annual upper limit of 4,800 SEK) and
special funds for shares (with an annual maximum of 7,200 SEK) are
granted a tax-free return over a five-year period. The annual savings
under this scheme are further entitled to a credit against income tax
liability amounting to 20 percent for bank account savings and 30 percent
for savings put into the special funds for shares. Another recent change
was the introduction of a temporary scheme to reduce the tax burden on
dividends. Starting in 1981, and pending a possible introduction of an
imputation system, shareholders are allowed a credit against their income
tax liabilities of 30 percent of dividends received. This credit, however,
may not exceed, 4,500 SEK for a married couple (2,250 SEK for a single
person).
Capital gains are taxed in Sweden, although only upon realization. A
fraction of capital gains is included in the income tax base. For long-term92 Sweden
gains the inclusion rate ranges from zero on personal property to 100
percent on real estate, and for financial assets, such as shares, it is 40
percent (further details may be found in section 4.2.8).
Over the past decade there has been a growing concern in Sweden
about the efficiency effects of the present system of taxing capital income.
There is a widespread belief that the tax system diverts savings into
"unproductive" investments such as art, antiques, gold, and consumer
durables at the expense of financial assets such as bank accounts and
corporate securities, which are used to channel savings into business
investment in fixed capital. Residential investment in owner-occupied
housing and summer cottages is also favored by the tax system. Owner-
occupied housing provides a noteworthy exception to the general princi-
ple of taxing only realized income. Homeownership—including summer
cottages—in Sweden is taxed by imputing an income at a rate of 2 percent
(with higher rates on more expensive houses) on the tax-assessed value of
the house. This imputed income is included in the income tax base of the
owner. The tax-assessed values are approximately 75 percent of the
market values at the time they are set, and the assessments are changed at
intervals of about five years. Mortgage interest is fully deductible in
computing the personal income tax base. Real capital gains on housing
(defined by indexing the acquisition cost) are taxed upon realization, with
an inclusion rate of 100 percent. New rules enacted in 1981 imply a partial
departure from the principle of taxing real capital gains by disallowing
indexation of the acquisition cost for the first four years of ownership.
For more than a decade, the national income tax schedules have been
changed almost annually. Since 1979 these revisions have been based on
changes in the consumer price index. It would, however, be wrong to
conclude that personal income taxation in Sweden is fully indexed. The
basic deductions and allowances described above are all defined as fixed
nominal amounts, and changes in these deductions and allowances have
been implemented only ad hoc. Moreover, the taxation of capital income
is unindexed, and tax is charged on nominal capital gains (except for
housing) and nominal interest receipts.
The income tax schedule in Sweden is highly progressive. The degree
of progressivity may be expressed in terms of the elasticity of net of tax
income (the percentage change in posttax income resulting from a 1
percent change in pretax income). With a proportional tax schedule the
elasticity is unity, whereas under a progressive tax system it is less than
unity. During the 1950s and 1960s, the elasticity was about 0.8 for the
largest groups of wage earners and varied little between different income
levels. But as a result of the major tax reform of 1971, progressivity was
increased, and since the beginning of the 1970s the elasticity has been
about 0.6.
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posttax income for different levels of pretax income in 1979. The income
distribution curve shows the fraction (percentage) of the total number of
income earners in income brackets with an average income of no less than
the indicated amount.
4.2.2 The Corporate Tax System
The corporation is by far the most important legal form of enterprise in
Sweden. Table 4.2, which is based on a special investigation carried out
for this study by the Swedish Central Bureau of Statistics (SCB), shows
the share of sales originating from corporations in several industry
groups. The proportion of total sales originating from corporations in
1979 is less than 90 percent only for wholesale and retail trade. This
industry group also exhibits large shares of partnerships and so-called
economic associations (a cooperative form of enterprise).
Corporations pay both local and national income tax. The national
income tax at present amounts to 40 percent of taxable profits. The local
income tax varies between different communities, averaging about 29
percent in 1980. Local income tax payments are deductible (with one
year's lag) from the national tax assessment, making the total statutory
tax burden on corporate net profits approximately 57 percent. This
statutory tax rate is used in section 4.2.5 to compute the parameter value
for T, the tax rate on corporate profits. As will be explained, its value
depends also on the rules for the investment funds system, allowing firms
to deduct up to 50 percent of their profits.
The Swedish corporate income tax may be described as a classical
system of company taxation. Corporations pay a flat rate of tax on all
taxable profits, and the shareholders in their turn are liable to income tax
on dividends. Since the early 1960s, however, some mitigation of the
double taxation of dividends has been offered at the firm level through
the so-called Annell legislation. According to the rules in force in 1980,




























Source: Central Bureau of Statistics (SCB).
aOnly part of private services are included.95 The Tax System
firms are allowed to deduct against current profits dividends on newly
issued shares for a maximum of twenty years following a new share issue.
The sum of deductions taken may not exceed the amount raised by the
issue, and the annual deduction is further restricted to a maximum of 10
percent of the issue. The Annell rules in force in 1970 were less generous
than those applying in 1980, allowing a maximum deduction of 5 percent
for ten years. No mitigation of double taxation was offered in 1960.
Formally, this can be described in the following way. Let h be the rate
of Annell deduction per dollar of new issue and assume this deduction to
be taken for co years (hu> - 1). Annual tax savings are rh, and the present





where p is to be the firm's discount rate.
Note that this expression is the present value of tax saved per dollar of
new issues. To incorporate the Annell deduction into the theoretical
framework of our study, it must be transformed into an equivalent tax
saving per dollar of gross investment. This necessitates a rather formal
treatment, which is relegated to Appendix C. We show there that the
economic effect of the Annell deduction may be modeled by adding, in
the case of new share issues, an additional term to the expression for A
(the present value for tax allowances) reflecting the value of the deduc-
tion. This is given in equation (C.5) of Appendix C. When the Annell
deduction is incorporated in this way the value of 6 ("the opportunity cost
of retained earnings in terms of dividends forgone") is set equal to unity.
4.2.3 Tax Allowances for Depreciation and Inventories
The effective tax burden on corporate profits depends upon the rules
governing the valuation of inventories and the depreciation allowances
for fixed assets. Firms are required to value inventories at acquisition cost
or market value, whichever is lower, and this means that for tax purposes
profits are calculated according to the principle of "first in, first out"
(FIFO). As an offset to this, a deduction is allowed up to a maximum of
60 percent of the value of net purchases of inventories. This main rule is
inter alia supplemented by an additional rule ("supplementary rule I")
that makes it possible for firms reducing their inventories to base inven-
tory write-down on the average size of inventories for the past two years.
Construction firms receive a special tax treatment for that part of their
inventories that consists of buildings either not yet completed or only
recently completed. On assets of this kind, inventory write-down is
limited to approximately 15 percent.
The Swedish rules for taxing inventories imply that v = 1 for all indus-
try groups, and/2 =0.6 for inventories in manufacturing and commerce.96 Sweden
For other industry (which includes construction) the weighted average
value for/2 is 0.193.
The rules of inventory write-down described above were supplemented
in 1980 by a scheme that allowed firms to defer corporate taxes by making
allocations to a "profit equalization fund." The size of the fund is limited
to 20 percent of the firm's total wage costs, and the amount allocated for
one year is included with taxable income for the following year unless
offset by a new allocation. If use is made of this scheme, regular inventory
write-down is limited to 45 percent compared with the normal 60 percent.
The stated motive for the introduction of this new scheme in 1980 was
to give firms with either no inventories or limited inventories an oppor-
tunity to defer corporate taxes. Judging from the empirical investigations
carried out by the Government Committee on Business Taxation in the
mid-1970s and by Rundfelt (1982), however, it seems clear that for the
three industry groups included in this study the "representative" firm has
continued to use the regular rules of inventory write-down rather than the
new scheme. The rules of the "profits equalization fund" have therefore
not been taken into account in our calculations.
As far as machinery and equipment are concerned, the acquisition cost
may be depreciated for tax purposes at a rate of 30 percent per annum on
a declining balance basis (the "30 rule"). This means that/2 = a = 0.3,
since the first allowances may be taken in the year of acquisition, and
fi = 1 -f2 = 0.7, in terms of the notation of chapter 2. At any time,
though, firms have an option to choose instead—for the entire stock of
machines—the accounting value that would result from five years'
straight-line depreciation. In other words, a firm is free to write off an
amount needed to bring the remaining value down to what it would have
been had the firm from the outset written off 20 percent of the original
amount invested. For a single investment it is profitable to switch to the
"20 rule" after the third year. A growing firm, however, with many young
vintages of capital, would always stick to the "30 rule." Our assumptions
about f2 and a for investments in machinery therefore may be thought of
as applying to such a firm.
Fiscal depreciation of buildings is generally carried out on a straight-
line basis. The lifetime for tax purposes varies between buildings of
different types and different uses, according to special guidelines issued
by the tax authorities. A comparison between these guidelines and the
actual composition of investments in buildings—as reflected in the cal-
culations of capital stocks carried out by the Central Bureau of Statistics
(see section 4.2.4)—indicates that buildings within the "manufacturing
industry" are typically written off using a lifetime of twenty-eight years,
compared with thirty-three years for "other industry" and thirty-six years
for "commerce." Buildings completed since 1970, however, are treated97 The Tax System
more favorably. During the first five years, firms are allowed to deduct an
additional 2 percent per year, which shortens the tax lifetime of the asset.
The rules of tax depreciation for buildings may be expressed in terms of
the present discounted value of depreciation allowances, Az, which is
given by
4 n
(4.2) A2 = 0.02 + - + (o.O2 + -\ f e~
pudu + - f e~
pudu,
0 4
where L is the tax lifetime.
The first term of this expression reflects the fact that the first allowances
may be taken in the year of acquisition. Depreciation is carried out for n
years, where n is determined, so as to make the sum of all allowances
equal to the acquisition cost:
(4.3) 0.02 + - + 4(o.O2 + -) + (n -4)- = 1.
This gives n - 0.9L - 1 for use in the calculations. Before 1970 no "pri-
mary deductions" were allowed, and the period of fiscal depreciation was
therefore n = L — 1.
4.2.4 Estimates of Economic Depreciation
It is generally believed that the Swedish rules of fiscal depreciation are
generous—at least in times of stable prices—allowing firms to defer
corporate tax payments. The extent of accelerated write-off is, however,
difficult to determine owing to lack of reliable studies on rates of eco-
nomic depreciation.
The most ambitious attempt to calculate economic depreciation in
Sweden is that of the Central Bureau of Statistics (SCB), and our assump-
tions about rates of economic depreciation correspond to those implicitly
used by the SCB. The purpose of this section is to describe the rather
complicated procedure employed by the SCB in estimating net capital
stocks and economic depreciation. The implied rates of economic depre-
ciation are shown in table 4.3.
For each specific category of asset for which capital stocks are esti-
mated—a machine of a certain type used in a certain industry—the SCB
assigns a time pattern, according to which the assets of a given cohort are
retired from service, and an assumed mean value for the age at which the
asset is retired. The retirement patterns have been obtained from the set
of survivor curves estimated by Winfrey (1935) for the United States
during the 1930s, whereas the assumptions on average retirement age are
based on a number of Swedish sources. The main source for the assump-
tions on average retirement age is Wallander (1962).98 Sweden




























Source: Own calculations based on estimates of economic depreciation and net capital
stocks of the Central Bureau of Statistics (SCB).
"Machinery is a weighted average of equipment and vehicles in each industry.
bThe row for total is a weighted average of machinery and buildings in each industry.
The major explanation for this rather high figure is the fast depreciation of equipment in the
building and construction sector (one-third of all equipment in other industry). The average
depreciation rate for this kind of asset is nearly 22 percent (drilling machines, grinding
machines, cement mixers, bulldozers, and similar heavy equipment subjected to very rough
usage).
The Winfrey survivor curves combined with the SCB assumptions on
average retirement age form the basis for perpetual-inventory estimates
of gross capital stocks. These estimates of gross capital stocks can be
thought of as implying a "sudden death" assumption for each single asset,
which means that an asset maintains full productive efficiency until the
moment it is retired. The time of retirement varies among the different
assets of a vintage, however, as reflected by the survivor curve.
The SCB also provides estimates of economic depreciation based on
unpublished calculations of net capital stocks. Net capital stocks are
calculated by adjusting the gross capital stocks to allow for the fact that
the value of an asset declines as it approaches the age of retirement. The
approach chosen by the SCB for this purpose can be explained in the
following way. Assume that a cohort of assets of a given vintage originally
consists of N machines, each of unit value. The number of machines
remaining in service after u years is then S(u)N, where S(u) represents
the "normalized" survivor curve, which takes the value of unity for a new
vintage. At time u, —S(u)N machines are retired from service. The
average retirement age of the assets of this cohort is therefore
CO





where w represents the maximum age of the cohorts (implying that
S(oi) = 0). For those assets that still remain in service after n years (at
time u = n), the average age of retirement is99 The Tax System
(4.5)
S(n)N
The average expected remaining life of the assets surviving after n years is
therefore d(n) — n.
Now the SCB simply assumes that an asset still in service after n years
retains a fraction fin) of its original value equal to the ratio between the
average expected remaining life \d{n) - n] and the average total ex-
pected life d(n):
The "valuation coefficient"/(n) takes the value unity for a new vintage
(n = 0) and declines to zero at the maximum age of the cohort (n = co). By
multiplying f(n) by the number of assets surviving, the SCB obtains a
value-age profile (n = 0, . . . , co) for a cohort of assets of a given vintage.
(4.7) b{n) = S(n)Nf(n), n = 0, . . . ,o.
For manufacturing industry, the most frequently used survivor curve
for machinery (the Winfrey S1 curve) has an assumed average retirement
age of twenty-five years. The corresponding b(n) curve is then almost
linear for the first one-third of the maximum life and approximately
geometric for the remaining two-thirds.
This approach forms the basis for perpetual-inventory estimates of net
capital stocks. Economic depreciation is then obtained as the difference
between gross investment and the change in the net capital stock. To
determine the actual rates of depreciation implicit in the calculations
performed by the SCB, we have related economic depreciation, D, to the
corresponding values of the net capital stocks, K. (Data on net capital
stocks are not published by the SCB. Our calculations on rates of eco-
nomic depreciation are therefore based on unpublished tables at the
four-digit level, obtained directly from the SCB.) We define the rate of
economic depreciation to be
(4-8) 8M = ^.
The parameter 8M combines the effects of retirement from service
(assuming no in-place loss of efficiency) and decline in value as assets
approach the time of retirement. Our calculations, covering a thirty-year
period ending in 1979, indicate a remarkable constancy of the implicit 8U.
The degree of constancy is particularly striking for buildings, with
practically no variation over time. As a good approximation, therefore,100 Sweden
the SCB estimates of economic depreciation are equivalent to estimates
based on the simple case of geometric depreciation with a constant 8.
Our estimated depreciation rates are shown in table 4.3. These are an
average of the implicit rates described above for the years 1970-79. The
marked differences between the industry groups in the depreciation rates
for machinery are largely explained by the different proportions of rap-
idly depreciating vehicles.
It is interesting to compare the estimates with the results of a recent
survey carried out by the Industriens Utredningsinstitut (IUI) and the
Federation of Swedish Industries (Wallmark 1978). According to this
survey, manufacturing firms estimated the average length of life of newly
installed machinery as 14.3 years and that of new buildings as 28.7 years.
The exact meaning of these answers is unclear. Assuming, however, that
the pattern of depreciation is geometric, which implies that the average
length of life is the inverse of the rate of depreciation, these numbers may
be interpreted as average rates of depreciation of 7.0 and 3.5 percent,
respectively. These rates are not far from those implicit in the SCB
estimates of economic depreciation for manufacturing.
4.2.5 Investment Grants and Incentives
An important feature of the Swedish corporate income tax is the
investment funds system (IF). The idea behind the system is to induce
firms to reserve profits during boom years to be used for investment
during subsequent recessions. The IF system was introduced in 1938 but
did not gain importance until 1955, when the rules were changed. In that
year firms started to make tax-free allocations to investment funds, and in
the 1958 recession funds were released for the first time. Since then,
releases of investment funds have been more and more frequent. In
particular, the efforts during the 1970s to promote industrial growth
meant that firms were able to use the IF system almost continuously for
new investment. Since the mid-1960s the IF system has also been used
extensively for regional policy purposes.
The investment funds system works as follows. Each year a firm can
deduct up to 50 percent of its tax profits by "allocating" an equivalent
amount to its investment fund (appearing as an entry on the balance
sheet). Since the IF allocation takes the form of a deduction against
taxable profits, tax payments are reduced by an amount equal to the
allocation times the (statutory) corporate tax. However, 50 percent of the
allocation must be deposited interest-free at the Central Bank (the re-
mainder may be used for any purpose). Hence, even if the funds are
never used again, IF allocations provide an attractive alternative to
paying profits tax: 50 percent is paid to the Central Bank rather than 57
percent to the government as profits tax.101 The Tax System
When the investment funds are released, for example during a reces-
sion, firms are allowed to withdraw from the Central Bank deposits
corresponding to 50 percent of the cost of investments considered to be
financed by the IF. Depending on the rules set up for a particular release,
firms are sometimes also granted an extra investment allowance in the tax
assessment amounting to 10 percent of the IF used. (This refers to a
so-called 9:1 release that was in effect at the end of the 1970s and
beginning of 1980s.) Investments financed by IF, on the other hand, are
considered to be fully written off for tax purposes. Firms lose, therefore,
the possibility of deducting fiscal depreciation.
As pointed out, the IF system was put to extensive use during the
1970s. Available data indicate, though, that the firms in the industry
groups included in our study financed less than 20 percent of their
investments by investment funds. It seems reasonable to assume, there-
fore, that the marginal investment considered for this study must be
written off according to the regular rules of fiscal depreciation rather than
through the IF system.
This view does not imply, however, that the profitability of the mar-
ginal investment is unaffected by the IF system. As explained, Swedish
corporations are allowed to reduce the income tax base by allocating up
to 50 percent of taxable profits to an IF. This means that 50 percent of the
profits from the marginal investment will be taxed at the statutory corpo-
rate tax rate of 57 percent, while the remaining 50 percent will be
untaxed. There is, however, an implicit cost to the firm of the allocation,
and this cost equals the interest forgone on the 50 percent of the alloca-
tion that must be deposited with the Central Bank plus the increased tax
payments owing to the loss of regular depreciation allowances on assets
financed by the IF.
By this line of argument, it seems reasonable to define the effective
corporate tax rate T to be used for our model calculations as a weighted
average of the statutory tax rate JS (which is 57 percent in 1980) and the
implicit cost of the IF allocation. To put the expression for the effective
corporate tax rate in a general form, we may introduce the following
notation: let € be the proportion of profits that may be allocated to the IF
and b be the proportion thereof that must be deposited with the Central
Bank. The IF allocation is used after n years, at which time the firm can
withdraw the Central Bank deposit. The effective corporate tax rate then
becomes
(4.9) T = (1 - €)T, + bt{\ - e~
pn) + £Ad e~
pn,
where TS is the statutory corporate tax rate and p the firm's after-tax rate
of discount (which depends on the source of finance). The second term of
the equation then represents the present value of the interest forgone on102 Sweden
the Central Bank deposit and the third term the present value of in-
creased tax payments owing to forgone depreciation allowances. During
the second half of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s, firms were
allowed to use the IF system almost continuously for new investment. For
1980 it seems reasonable, therefore, to assume a zero time lag between
allocation and use of the IF (n — 0). The cost to firms of IF allocations
would then be limited to the loss of regular depreciation allowances on
the acquired assets. In this case equation (4.9) simplifies to
(A If)) T = (A - f\rr + PA,
Both 1960 and 1970 represent peak years of the business cycle, and,
with a cycle length of four to five years, firms would expect a time lag of
about two years before the IF allocations could be used. We assume,
therefore, that n = 2 for 1960 and 1970. The details of the IF system given
above imply, furthermore, that € has a value of 0.5 for 1980. For 1960 and
1970 € equals 0.4. In 1980, 50 percent of an IF allocation had to be
deposited with the Central Bank, which means that b equals 0.5. For 1960
and 1970 b takes the value 0.46.
Considering that the present discounted value of regular depreciation
allowances per unit of investment is lower for buildings than for machin-
ery, it seems reasonable to assume that a tax-minimizing firm would use
its investment funds for investments in buildings rather than machinery.
This assumption will be used here, and the definition of Ad in equation
(4.9) is therefore (see section 4.2.3):
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The effective corporate tax rate T, as defined by (4.9), is a function of
the firm's after-tax discount rate p, and this means that it depends on the
source of finance used in connection with future IF releases. However, to
reduce the programming work involved for our numerical estimates, we
use the same parameter value for T for all sources of finance. This value is
computed by using for p a weighted average of p (as obtained for the
"fixed-r" case) for each source of finance. The weights correspond to the
1980 proportions of debt, new share issues, and retained earnings for the
three industry groups aggregated. This procedure makes it possible, in
turn, to approximate equation (4.9) by a linear function of the inflation
rate (IT). This means that T = 0.449 - 1.06-JT for 1980 and T - 0.410 -
0.41-rr and T = 0.454 - 0.49-TT for 1960 and 1970, respectively. At 9.4
percent inflation, which is the rate of inflation actually experienced in103 The Tax System
Sweden over 1971-80, the effective corporate tax rate T is therefore 34.9
percent, compared with the statutory corporate tax rate (T^) of 57 per-
cent. For 1960 and 1970, statutory corporate tax rates were 49 and 53
percent, and (at the same inflation rate) effective corporate tax rates were
37 and 41 percent, respectively.
On occasions there have been special and temporary improvements of
depreciation rules and special tax reductions to stimulate investment.
These types of stimuli appear to have been used more frequently in recent
years. Thus, in 1976-78 firms were offered an extra investment allowance
of 25 percent for machinery and equipment, for national income tax
purposes. Regular fiscal depreciation was not affected by this extra
allowance. This investment allowance was reintroduced in 1980, and the
rate was then set at 20 percent for both the local and national tax
assessments. A 10 percent allowance was granted for buildings. With a
statutory corporate tax rate of 57 percent, these investment allowances
are equivalent to investment grants of 11.4 percent for machinery and 5.7
percent for buildings. We assume, therefore,/3 = 1 and g = 0.114 for
machinery, and/3 = 1 and g = 0.057 for buildings.
In addition to the grants and tax allowances discussed above, large
subsidies were extended to manufacturing firms during the recession of
the late 1970s. These were provided ad hoc, to a large extent in the form
of rescue operations to maintain employment. The magnitude of pay-
ments is discussed in section 4.4.4. For this reason we have not included
such subsidies in our calculations and have restricted our attention to
statutory rates of allowances and grants.
The general sales tax that was in effect in Sweden between 1959 and
1969 included gross investments in its base. Tax payments were deduct-
ible against the corporation income tax base. In 1960 the general sales tax
was levied at the rate of 4 percent and the corporate tax rate was 49
percent. Therefore the sales tax was equivalent to a negative investment
grant of 2 percent (/3 = 1 and g = -0.02 in 1960).
4.2.6 Local Taxes
The local income tax in Sweden applies not only to individuals but also
to corporations. The tax on individuals was discussed in section 4.2.1.
The base of the corporate tax—which is similar to that of the national
corporation income tax—is defined by the central government, while the
rates are determined by the local authorities. The same rate is applied to
companies as to individuals. In 1980 the countrywide average was 29
percent.
A Swedish corporation is not liable for property taxes as usually
defined. For local income tax purposes, however, a firm must declare an
amount corresponding to 2 percent of the assessed value of its buildings
and real estate. This "guarantee amount" is deductible from profits for104 Sweden
the local income tax assessment, but taxable income cannot fall below the
guarantee amount. The effect of this is to levy a minimum tax on firms
equal to the product of the tax rate and 2 percent of the value of their real
estate. We have ignored this provision (which is not relevant to marginal
investment in machinery and inventories) and assumed that firms invest-
ing in buildings have taxable profits above the guarantee amount.
4.2.7 Wealth Taxes
The Swedish wealth tax applies only to individuals. Capital values of
insurance policies and individually acquired pension rights are excluded
from the tax base. The 1980 schedule (unchanged since 1975) levied a
zero tax rate on net wealth (assets less liabilities) below 200,000 SEK, a 1
percent rate on wealth between 200,000 and 275,000, 1.5 percent be-
tween 275,000 and 400,000, 2 percent between 400,000 and 1,000,000,
and 2.5 percent on wealth exceeding 1,000,000 SEK.
A detailed description of the distribution of household wealth in
Sweden for 1975 is presented in Spant (1979), and this study makes it
possible to estimate the marginal wealth tax rates implied by a hypothet-
ical 1 percent increase in household wealth. Spant shows the holdings of
various assets such as real estate, bank accounts, and shares for thirteen
different classes of taxable net wealth. Using this information and the
marginal tax rates for each class of net wealth, as implied by the tax
schedule, we have obtained separate estimates of the weighted average
marginal tax rates on the holdings of equity and debt. For 1975 the
marginal wealth tax rate on equity turned out to be 1.5 percent, com-
pared with 0.4 percent on bank account holdings. Since there is almost no
direct lending (through bonds, for example) from households to the
business sector, the tax rate on bank account holdings has been used as
our estimate of the marginal wealth tax rate on debt.
The different marginal tax rates on equity and debt obviously reflect
the differences in the distribution of the holdings of shares and bank
accounts among households. Wealthy households have invested a larger
proportion of their net wealth in shares than have less wealthy house-
holds. An additional indication of this fact is that 35 percent of the total
amount of shares owned by households are held by households paying the
top marginal wealth tax rate, whereas for bank account holdings the
corresponding figure is barely 4 percent. On the other hand, households
with taxable net wealth below the tax-exempt limit own 10 percent of
household shareholdings and 26 percent of total bank holdings.
With an average rate of inflation of nearly 10 percent since the mid-
1970s, it is reasonable to expect the marginal wealth tax rates to be higher
in 1980 than in 1975. Assuming the average net wealth within each wealth
class to increase at the rate of inflation and the relative distributions of
bank account and shareholdings to be unchanged, we have estimated that105 The Tax System
the marginal tax rate on equity actually rose from 1.5 percent in 1975 to
1.9 percent in 1980, compared with an increase from 0.4 to 0.8 percent on
debt.
The wealth tax schedule, introduced in 1975 and still in force in 1980,
was changed in 1981. This revision reduced the estimated marginal tax
rates to their 1975 level. Because the revision of the schedule in 1981
effectively reestablished the marginal tax rates of 1975, we have chosen as
our estimates for 1980 the average of the 1975 values (which equal the
1981 values) and 1980 values. The assumed marginal wealth tax rate is
therefore 1.7 percent on equity and 0.6 percent on debt.
4.2.8 Household Tax Rates
Average marginal income tax rates on investment income of house-
holds are shown in table 4.4 for the years 1960,1970, and 1980 and for the
proposals due to be implemented in full by 1985.
The figures for 1980 are based on a special investigation carried out for
this study by the Central Bureau of Statistics (SCB). Since the mid-1970s
the SCB has collected detailed information on household income based
on a sample survey of tax returns and other sources. This data base
(HINK), which consists of approximately 28,000 individuals from a
population of 8.2 million, has been used to estimate the relative distribu-
tions of dividends and interest receipts over different income brackets in
1978. (The Swedish term for the income concept used is sammanrdknad
nettoinkomst.) To obtain reliable estimates, it has been necessary, fur-
thermore, to combine the regular HINK data base with a supplementary
sample of wealthy households.
1 This supplementary sample was not avail-
able for 1979 and 1980.
Since the basic data were available only for 1978, we have assumed that
the "real" distributions (that is, adjusted for changes in the price level) of
dividends and interest receipts were the same in 1978 and 1980. The
average incomes of each of the nineteen income classes employed in 1978
were translated into corresponding nominal amounts for 1980. Marginal
tax rates for the different levels of income were obtained from the IUI
model of the System of Personal Income Taxation (see Jakobsson and
Normann 1974). The marginal tax rates were then weighted together to
obtain average marginal tax rates.
The first row of table 4.4 shows the weighted average marginal income
tax rates for households that receive dividends and interest income,
respectively. These numbers may, however, exaggerate the tax burden
on a marginal increase of investment income, since all households are
1. The HINK data base is described in annual publications from the SCB (see Statistical
Reports N1981:8.1). The procedure of using a supplementary sample of wealthy households
is explained in Spant (1979).106 Sweden
Table 4.4 Average Marginal Income Tax Rates (m) and



























Source: Own calculations as described in the text.
aWith the exemption limit for investment income taken into account.
allowed a limited amount of investment income free of tax (see section
4.2.1). We have therefore also calculated the share of dividends and
interest receipts, respectively, going to households whose net investment
income (dividends, interest receipts, etc., less interest costs) exceed the
maximum tax-free amount. The adjusted tax rates obtained by multi-
plying these shares by the corresponding marginal tax rates for each
income bracket then reflect the fact that some households do not pay any
tax on marginal increases in investment income. As shown by the second
row of the table, these calculations reduce the weighted average marginal
tax rates by two and one percentage points, respectively.
For purposes of comparison, table 4.4 also includes estimates of aver-
age marginal tax rates for 1970 and 1960. The estimates are based on our
own calculations using a 1966 study of the distributions of ownership of
shares and bank account holdings over different income brackets (Statens
Offentliga Utredningar 1969). These distributions were used, in turn, as
proxies for the distributions of dividends and of interest receipts.
The calculations assume that the real distributions of dividends and
interest receipts over income class were the same in 1960 and 1970 as in
the year of the study, 1966. The mean incomes for the income classes
employed in the 1966 study were translated into corresponding nominal
amounts for 1960 and 1970, using tax assessment statistics. As for 1980,
marginal tax rates were obtained from the IUI tax model.
Table 4.4 shows the statutory marginal tax rates on realized capital
gains on shares. Taxation of long-term capital gains on shares was first
introduced in Sweden in 1966 (see Rundfelt 1982). According to the rules
in force in 1970, 10 percent of the proceeds of the sale of shares were
included in the personal income tax base of the seller.
Assuming that investors expect capital gains to accrue at the nominal
rate of 5 percent per annum (the average increase in the stock market107 The Tax System
index at the time), and assuming a holding period often years, this "sales
tax" is equivalent to a statutory rate of tax on realized capital gains of 15
percent. The rules were then changed in the mid-1970s to define a tax on
realized nominal capital gains. The new rules require that 40 percent of
realized long-term nominal gains (in excess of a tax-free amount of 3,000
SEK) be included in the taxable income of the owner. This means that, at
the margin, the capital gains tax rate equals 40 percent of the income tax
rate. Long-term gains are gains on assets held for more than two years.
Short-term capital gains on assets held for less then two years are fully
taxed as income.
Finally, the last row of table 4.4 shows marginal income tax rate for the
tax reform due in 1985 but introduced into legislation in June 1982. The
figures shown are the tax rates that would have applied had the reform
been in full effect in 1980. The rules of the 1985 system have not been
incorporated into the IUI tax model, and the numbers reported are
therefore approximate. In addition, the 1985 tax system poses special
problems because of the division of the national income tax into a basic
tax and a supplementary tax. For the supplementary tax, negative income
from financial investments and homeownership {underskottsavdrag) may
not be used to offset wage income, and available information on the
distribution over income class of this negative income is not fully compa-
rable with the data used for table 4.4.
Chapter 2 of this book (as well as the country chapters for the United
Kingdom and the United States) discusses in some detail the problems
posed by the fact that households may hold debt instruments in a non-
interest-bearing form (such as sight deposits). It is assumed that non-
interest-bearing accounts yield a return in the form of bank services
provided free of charge. Income from non-interest-bearing deposits is
therefore deemed to be taxed at a zero rate. This implies, in turn, that the
marginal tax rate on income from debt instruments must be calculated as
a weighted average of the ordinary marginal tax rate (as shown in table
4.4) and the zero rate on non-interest-bearing deposits.
Household holdings of non-interest-bearing debt instruments are
much less important in Sweden than in other countries. Furthermore,
Swedish households do, as a rule, earn interest income on sight deposits
(such as checking accounts), albeit at a lower rate than on time deposits.
Income accruing to sight deposits in Sweden, therefore, will be consid-
ered to take the form of both interest income (which is taxed at ordinary
tax rates) and untaxed bank services. According to our approximate
calculations, the proportion of total household income on debt instru-
ments accruing as untaxed bank services was only 1.4 percent, leaving
98.6 percent of total debt income in taxable form. The marginal tax rates
of households applicable to debt finance are therefore equal to the tax
rates appearing in table 4.4 times 0.986. The 1980 marginal tax rate on108 Sweden
interest earnings of 49.9 percent is then reduced to 49.2 percent, and the
1985 tax rate is reduced from 43.9 to 43.3 percent.
The numbers appearing in the second column of table 4.4 represent the
average marginal income tax rates of household equity investors. As will
be explained below, it is important to distinguish between changes in the
tax system that affect these marginal income tax rates and changes that
affect the marginal tax burden on dividends alone. One reason for dis-
tinguishing between the two is illustrated by the operation of the 30
percent dividend tax credit scheme introduced in 1981. The tax credit
(against personal income tax and therefore relevant only to households)
applies only to the first 15,000 SEK of dividend income for a married
couple (the limit is 7,500 SEK for a single person). The effect on marginal
tax rates for dividends has therefore been estimated in a way similar to
that used when calculating the effects of exempting from tax certain
amounts of investment income. We have thus determined the share of a
marginal increase in dividends in each income bracket that would qualify
for the credit. According to these calculations, the new dividend tax
credit did reduce the 1980 average marginal tax rate on dividends by
eleven percentage points, from 64.0 to 53.0 percent. Alternatively, if the
1985 tax schedule had been in effect in 1980, the dividend tax credit
system would have reduced the marginal tax burden on dividends from
57.2 to 47.3 percent.
As mentioned in section 4.2.1, household taxation of investment in-
come has also been affected by concessions to some special forms of
savings—on special bank accounts and special funds for shares—intro-
duced at the end of the 1970s. There is unfortunately no obvious way to
translate the rules governing the "tax-savings" schemes into single "tax
rates" comparable to the marginal tax rates on regular forms of interest
receipts or dividends. The numbers reported below thus reflect several
somewhat arbitrary assumptions.
Consider an investor who puts one crown into a qualified special bank
account. He immediately receives a credit against his income tax liability
of twenty ore (20 percent), and no tax is charged on interest earnings
provided the crown—including compound interest—is kept in the
account for a full five years. After the required five years, the account
turns into a regular bank account with a taxable return. We shall assume,
therefore, that the investor withdraws his money (amounting to e'
5,
including compound interest) after five years. This assumption does not
limit the time horizon of the "representative" investor to five years,
however. As long as the annual savings in the scheme are below the
maximum sum allowed, the investment pattern described here may well
be repeated any number of times. We may assume, therefore, that upon
withdrawing the amount e'
5 in year five, the investor immediately returns
one crown to the special bank account and receives an additional tax109 The Tax System
credit of twenty ore. The present value of the (negative) tax payments
from repeating this procedure x times will then be
X




where 0.2 is the tax credit per crown of qualified savings, /(I - m) is the
after-tax rate of discount of the "representative" investor, and u denotes
time.
Now imagine an alternative hypothetical arrangement where no initial
tax credit is provided, but the investor has the option of paying tax (or,
rather, of receiving the subsidy involved) at the rate m
SB on his annual
interest earnings from the special bank account. The same investment
pattern in assumed, implying that the investor puts one crown into the
account at time zero and then makes additional deposits between years
zero and five to keep the same amount of money in the account as with the
scheme described above. The investment is repeated x times, and m
SB is





where T is defined by equation (4.12) above. The expression under the
integral sign of (4,13) is the present value of tax (subsidy) payments for
each five-year period, discounted to the beginning of each period. It is
immediately clear from (4.12) and (4.13) that the holding period of the
investor (denoted by the parameter x) does not affect m
SB.
Given the underlying assumptions, equations (4.12) and (4.13) can be
used to obtain the value of the "equivalent tax rate" m
SB. To an indi-
vidual with a marginal tax rate (m) of 49.9 percent, the special bank
savings scheme thus turns out to be equivalent to a tax of minus 3.3
percent on the annual return on the investment plan, assuming a market
interest rate (/) of 15 percent. The value of 15 percent was chosen to be
representative of nominal market rates at the time, although the equiva-
lent tax rate is rather insensitive to changes in the assumed value for i.
The effects on household tax rates of the concessions to savings in the
special funds for shares were estimated in a similar manner. There are at
present seven funds in operation (six of which are run by banks) that
acquire shares on the stock market. Savings channeled into these funds
must be kept for five years, and all dividends received by the funds must
be reinvested. The individual is granted a credit against his income tax
liability of 30 percent of his annual savings made under the scheme, and
no taxes are charged on dividends and capital gains accruing within
five years.110 Sweden
An immediate question here is whether the 30 percent tax credit
granted by the scheme should be regarded as an offset to tax payments on
dividends or on capital gains. We have settled this question by consider-
ing two funds. One of the funds is assumed to specialize in shares from
corporations paying all their after-tax profits as dividends. No capital
gains are thus expected on the portfolio of this fund. The other fund
acquires shares from corporations that retain all their profits. The return
on the portfolio of this fund would then accrue only as capital gains.
On the basis of these two polar cases, the "equivalent" tax rates on
dividends and capital gains can be determined. Consider the first fund
specializing in shares from corporations paying all their profits as div-
idends. Let the dividend yield on the portfolio of this fund be |x. Since all
dividends are reinvested, one crown put into the fund at time zero will
earn dividends of \x,e*
u at time u. The "equivalent tax rate" m
SFmay then
be derived in exactly the same way as m








where 0.3 is the tax credit per crown of savings in the special funds for
shares. Assuming the pretax rate of discount and the return on the
portfolio of the fund to be 15 percent (/ = 0.15, (x = 0.15), the "equiva-
lent tax rate" m
SF would then be -4.7 percent for a "representative"
equity investor with a marginal tax rate of 64 percent (m = 0.64; see table
4.4).
The second fund, by assumption, specializes in corporate shares paying
no dividends. Let the rate of growth in the value of the shares of this fund
be (3. At the end of the tax-free five-year period, therefore, the investor
withdraws an amount e
p
5 per crown of initial savings. The "equivalent tax
rate" zf
F may then be defined as the rate of tax (subsidy) that would yield
the same present value of capital gains tax payment (subsidy) if applied to
the conventionally defined capital gain of <?
p
5 - 1 as the 30 percent tax






Assuming (3 = / = 0.15, the "equivalent tax rate" zf
F is then -35.2
percent.
The tax savings schemes discussed here have not been taken into
account for the "standard case" estimates of effective tax rates for 1980
(presented in section 4.4.1). We have chosen instead to consider the tax
savings schemes as part of the "new 1981 rules," which also include the
dividend tax credit system described above. This requires an assumption
about the weight to be attached to the tax savings schemes in estimating
household tax rates.Ill The Tax System
Both types of tax savings schemes were introduced in 1978, but interest
initially was largely confined to the special bank accounts. At the end of
1979, 8 percent of taxpayers participated, and, of those, only one in ten
chose to put his or her savings into the special funds for shares. The
average annual savings amounted to almost 70 percent of the maximum
amounts allowed. During 1980 the rules of the special funds for shares
were changed, increasing the initial tax credit from 20 to 30 percent and
the maximum amount of qualified annual savings from 4,800 to 7,200
SEK. After these changes, savings in the special funds for shares grew
rapidly. By mid-1981 the participation rate for the two schemes together
had risen to 15 percent of eligible taxpayers and, of those, almost 30
percent used the special funds for shares. Average annual savings still
amounted to about two-thirds of the maximum sums allowed.
It is notable that households on average have not used the "tax sav-
ings" schemes to the maximum extent. It seems reasonable, therefore, to
expect that an increase of household savings, of the kind assumed when
defining the "margin" in this study, would be directed both through
regular channels—for example, bank accounts and the stock market—
and through the "tax savings" schemes. With this view, an assumption
must be made regarding the proportion of total household savings in
banks that would be channeled through the special bank accounts and the
proportion of household equity investments that would be put into spe-
cial funds for shares.
In mid-1981 the market value of the holdings of the special funds for
shares amounted to approximately 3 percent of total household share-
holdings. Holdings in the special bank accounts (including compound
interest) were also about 3 percent of total household bank holdings.
These numbers may give an unduly conservative picture of the impor-
tance of the "tax savings" schemes, however. Considering that the
schemes were introduced as late as 1978, it seems more appropriate to use
flow data. For 1981 the flow of deposits into special bank accounts
amounted to 10 percent of the total increase in household bank holdings.
As for the special funds for shares, by mid-1981 household deposits had
risen to an annual rate corresponding to 6 percent of the total amount of
equity capital obtained by the nonfinancial sector by way of new issues
and (gross) retained earnings. These numbers, 10 and 6 percent, respec-
tively, have been used as weights when determining the effects of the tax
savings schemes on household marginal tax rates on interest income,
dividends, and capital gains.
The "tax savings" scheme is therefore assumed to reduce the marginal
tax rate on interest income from 49.2 to 44.0 percent (= 0.9 x 0.49 + 0.1
(-0.033)). As mentioned above, the 1981 dividend tax credit system
alone effectively reduces the marginal tax rate on dividend receipts from
64.0 to 53.0 percent. Considering the special funds for shares, this mar-
ginal tax rate is further reduced to 49.5 percent (0.94 x 0.53 + 0.06 x112 Sweden
( — 0.047)). Similarly, the capital gains tax rate is reduced from 26.1
percent to 22.4 percent (0.94 x 0.261 + 0.06 x (-0.352)).
As already pointed out, the reduction in the marginal tax rate on
dividends (md) brought about by the dividends credit system and the "tax
savings" scheme must be distinguished from a reduction in the statutory
marginal income tax rate (m) of the equity investors. The expressions for
the cost of capital with equity finance derived in chapter 2 of this book
assume the existence of a market for alternative financial investments
where the nominal rate of return is taxed as income at the marginal rate of
income tax (m). This after-tax rate of return represents the rate of
discount used for determining the cost of capital for equity-financed
corporate investments in fixed capital. Measures that affect only the
taxation of corporate dividends, such as the Swedish dividend credit
system, leave unaffected the rate of discount used by equity investors.
To incorporate the difference between the tax rates m and md into the
analytical framework set out in chapter 2, consider a marginal investment
in fixed capital of unit value financed by a new share issue at the beginning
of a year. To simplify notation we will abstract from inflation, initial
allowances, investment grants, and so forth, and assume that the rate of
fiscal depreciation equals the rate of true economic depreciation, 8. The
gross return on investment is MRR, which accrues at the end of the year.
The firm then immediately sells the asset and repays the money put up by
the shareholders at the beginning of the year. Assuming that the firm, by
selling the asset, obtains an amount equal to the replacement value,
1 - 8, there remains an amount
(4.16) (MRR-8)(1-T)
to be distributed to the shareholders as a dividend. This dividend is taxed
at the marginal tax rate md, and, to make it worthwhile for the sharehold-
ers to participate in the new issue, the net dividend must equal the
after-tax return the shareholders could obtain on alternative financial
investments:
(4.17) (MRR - 8)(1 - T)(1 - md) = /(I - m),
where / is the investors' pretax opportunity cost of funds, which we take






The corresponding expression in chapter 2 is
(4.19) MRR = + 8,
(l--r)e
which implies that113 The Tax System
(4.20)
\ — m
Before the dividend credit system was introduced as part of the per-
sonal income tax in 1981, md was equal to m, and the "opportunity cost of
retained earnings in terms of dividends forgone," 0, therefore took the
value of unity. The "new 1981 rules," which reduced md from 0.640 to
0.495, then raised the value of 6 to 1.403. However, since the dividend
credit system as well as the tax savings scheme applies only to households,
0 still takes the value of unity for the categories "tax-exempt institutions"
and "insurance companies."
For the 1985 tax schedule m is reduced from 0.640 to 0.572. In com-
bination with the 1981 dividend credit system, the marginal tax rate on
dividends md is then 0.473, and this implies that 0 for households takes
the value 1.23.
4.2.9 Tax-Exempt Institutions
Tax-exempt institutions by definition pay no tax on interest receipts,
dividends, or capital gains. This category of owner includes different
kinds of charities, scientific and cultural foundations, and foundations for
employee recreation set up by companies. It also includes the equivalent
of pension funds for supplementary occupational pension schemes.
One line of business of Swedish life insurance companies is to provide
individual or collective pension plans. Such pension plans belong to tax
category P ("pension insurance"), which exempts the insurance com-
panies from tax on the yield of policy reserves. Contributions to indi-
vidual pension plans are deductible against the personal income tax base
up to a limit of 10 percent of earned income.
Contributions by employers to occupational pension schemes—deter-
mined by national collective bargaining—are likewise excluded from the
taxable income of employers. Pension payments received are fully tax-
able to individuals. Savings for pension purposes under the rules de-
scribed here thus receive the equivalent of consumption tax treatment.
The occupational pension scheme for white-collar workers in the pri-
vate sector (the PRI/FPG system) is rather differently organized. Under
this system pension payments are handled by the participating firms
themselves, and these firms are required to account for their pension
obligations by entering an item called "pension debt" on their balance
sheets (see table 4.19 below). The size of the pension debt of each
individual firm is determined by the Pension Registration Institute (PRI)
according to conventional actuarial principles.
As the size of the estimated and required pension reserve changes, the
firm must make a corresponding allocation to its pension debt. This
allocation—which does not affect cash flow and does not require any114 Sweden
earmarking of the money retained—reduces reported profits and hence
the base of the corporation income tax. Pension payments are likewise
deductible against taxable profits.
These special features of the PRI/FPG system obviously do not affect
the size of the required pension reserve or pension payments. Had the
pension plan instead been administered by a separate insurance com-
pany—as is the case for blue-collar workers—pension reserve allocations
and pension payments would be covered by employer contributions and
by the earnings on the pension reserve. These earnings would be tax
exempt under the regulations of tax category P, described above. Em-
ployer contributions would also be tax deductible for the participating
firms.
The PRI/FPG system, allowing firms to exclude allocations to pension
debt and pension payments from their taxable income, therefore effec-
tively accords the same tax treatment to pension savings as is accorded to
the "category P" pension schemes described above. The PRI/FPG sav-
ings have thus been included in the category of tax-exempt institutions.
4.2.10 Insurance Companies
This category of owner includes property insurance companies, the
nonpension life insurance (category K) business of insurance companies,
and labor market organizations. We consider these in turn.
Property insurance companies—for the most part mutual companies—
pay a 29 percent local tax and a 40 percent national tax on the net income
of the business, including interest receipts, dividends, and capital gains.
Local tax payments, however, are deductible from the national tax
assessment with a one-year lag, making the total statutory tax rate
approximately 57 percent.
It is important to note that the financial investments of insurance
companies are treated as inventories by the tax authorities. The implica-
tion is that the accruing nominal changes in value of the investments (for
example, changes in the market value of shares) constitute taxable in-
come.
The effective tax rate on property insurance companies is, however,
reduced below the statutory tax rate of 57 percent by some provisions
affecting the tax base. First, companies are allowed to undervalue their
financial investments for tax purposes. Shares are valued at 60 percent of
their market value, and as a result taxable income is reduced by 0.4 when
a company acquires a share of unit value. As the market value of the
share changes, 60 percent of the accruing capital gain (or loss) is included
in the tax base. Financial investments in debt instruments are valued at 90
percent of market value. Second, a return of 4 percent on the investment
is effectively exempt from tax. This exemption is accomplished by allow-115 The Tax System
ing the companies to annually allocate an amount equal to a return of 4
percent on the insurance fund to a tax-free reserve.
The effective tax rate on the capital income of insurance companies can
then be determined in the following way. Let the statutory tax rate be rs,
and assume that a company acquires a financial investment of unit value
that is written down to 1 — 7 for tax purposes. The net cost of investment
is then 1 — yrs, since the undervaluation implies a deduction against the
tax base of 7. Assume, furthermore, that the market value of the invest-
ment grows at a rate (3 with a dividend yield of |x.
2 The taxable income on
the investment at time u will then equal dividends received plus the
accruing change in the tax accounting value of the investment, (1 — 7) (3
e^
u, less the tax-exempt return, r\e^
u (where in practice r\ equals 4
percent). The after-tax internal rate of return, j, on this investment is
defined by the following equation (where the last term is the present
value of after-tax proceeds from selling the investment at time 00):
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As explained, T^ is 0.57, and 7 equals 0.4 for shares and 0.1 for debt
instruments. A return of iq = 0.04 is exempt from tax. The effective tax
rate depends also on the actual yields to the insurance companies. For
1980 we have assumed a nominal rate of return (|x + (3) of 11.8 percent on
investments in shares and a 9.4 percent return on debt instruments. These
rates of return correspond to the average effective yield for 1971-80 on
the Stockholm Stock Exchange and on long-term industrial bonds, re-
spectively. Equation (4.24) then gives an effective tax rate on dividends
2. These parameters are defined and used similarly in section 4.2.8.116 Sweden
and accrued capital gains of 19 percent and an effective tax rate on
interest receipts of 28 percent.
It should be noted that the tax-exempt yield r\ is fixed in nominal terms,
and therefore the effective tax rate will depend on the inflation rate. The
1980 effective tax rates of 0.19 and 0.28 thus reflect the actual rate of
inflation used in our calculations for 1980, which is 9.4 percent. It is
obviously difficult to know what rates of return insurance companies
would have earned on their investments in 1980 in a hypothetical situa-
tion with no inflation. Equation (4.24) indicates that the effective tax rate
would be zero if the returns on equity and debt instruments did not
exceed 6.7 and 4.4 percent, respectively. It seems reasonable to assume
that the rates of return with zero inflation would be below these critical
values. We have assumed, therefore, an effective tax rate of zero in the
case of no inflation.
The second type of tax treatment of insurance companies relates to
nonpension life insurance business. Investment in this kind of policy
belongs to the K category (Kapital-insurance) for tax purposes. Pre-
miums are paid out of after-tax income, and the proceeds of such policies
are not taxable. The insurance companies are liable for a 29 percent local
tax and a 10 percent national tax on their net business income, including
interest receipts, dividends, and capital gains. Because local tax pay-
ments are deductible against the base of the national tax, the combined
result is a statutory tax rate of approximately 36 percent. This tax rate is
then effectively reduced by some special provisions affecting the tax base.
First, 5 percent of net capital income is exempt from taxation, and,
second, companies are allowed to reduce their tax base by a factor of
0.003 times a "base" amount (basbelopp) for each policy. This amount
was 16,000 SEK at the end of 1980. This last provision, however, is not
taken into account here because its effects are assumed to be intramar-
ginal. The total statutory tax rate on the return on insurance policies of
category K is therefore 34 percent (0.95 x 0.36).
As is the case for property insurance companies, the financial invest-
ments of the life insurance companies are treated as inventory holdings,
and the same rates of undervaluation for tax purposes apply. The provi-
sion that exempts from tax a 4 percent return on the insurance fund,
however, is not extended to life insurance companies. The effective tax





With TS = 0.34, the effective tax rate is 24 percent on dividends and
accrued capital gains and 32 percent on interest receipts.
Finally, our category "insurance companies" includes labor market
organizations. These pay a 29 percent local tax and a 15 percent national117 The Tax System
tax on dividends and interest receipts, making a total tax rate of 40
percent (allowing for the deductibility of local tax payments). Capital
gains are taxable according to the same schedule as for individuals (see
section 4.2.8). For 1980, therefore, the tax rate on realized capital gains
equals 40 percent of the marginal income tax rate—that is, 16 percent.
The marginal tax rates on insurance companies are summarized in
table 4.5. The rates for the three groups—property insurance, nonpen-
sion life business, and labor market organizations—were weighted to-
gether using 1980 ownership proportions. These were 0.67, 0.17, and
0.16, respectively, for equity, and 0.68, 0.22, and 0.10 for debt.
The effective tax rates of table 4.5 reflect the assumption that property
insurance companies earn a nominal rate of return of 11.8 percent on
their equity investments and 9.4 percent on debt instruments. The same
yield assumptions are used for 1960 and 1970 in order to focus interest on
the changes in tax legislation rather than on the combined effect over
time of changes in tax legislation and actual market yields. The rules of
undervaluation (expressed in the parameter 7) have applied since 1960,
and the increases in the marginal effective tax rates from 1960 through
1980 are explained by the increases in the statutory tax rates caused by the
gradual increases over time in local income tax rates.
The (weighted average) effective marginal tax rates of insurance com-
panies depend on the rate of inflation, to the extent that nominal yields to
property insurance companies are affected by inflation. The numbers
appearing in table 4.5 reflect the "actual rate of inflation" of 9.4 percent,
experienced over 1971-80. As explained above, it seems reasonable to
assume that the market yields to property insurance companies at zero
inflation would be sufficiently low to imply a zero marginal tax rate on
investment income. Our estimates of the effective (weighted average)
marginal tax rates of insurance companies at zero inflation, shown in
table 4.6, have been obtained using this assumption. The effective tax
rates for 10 percent inflation have been estimated by simply extrapolating
Table 4.5 Average Marginal Income Tax Rates (m) and
Statutory Capital Gains Tax Rates (zs)


















Source: Own calculations as described in the text.118 Sweden
Table 4.6 Average Marginal Income Tax Rates (m) and
Statutory Capital Gains Tax Rates (zs)


















Source: Own calculations as described in the text.
the rate of change in the effective tax rates between zero and 9.4 percent
inflation.
Swedish insurance companies (as well as households and tax-exempt
institutions) hold debt instruments in both interest-bearing and non-
interest-bearing forms. According to our estimates, non-interest-bearing
debt accounted for 4.7 percent of the total debt holdings of insurance
companies in 1980, and, as explained in section 4.2.8, we assume that
income from non-interest-bearing debt (accruing as bank services) is
taxed at a zero rate. The marginal tax rate of insurance companies
applicable to debt finance (to be used for the calculations presented in
section 4.4 below) is therefore obtained by multiplying the marginal tax
rate derived in this section, and shown in tables 4.5 and 4.6, by
(1-0.047).
4.3 The Structure of the Capital Stock and Its Ownership
In section 4.2 we presented the parameters needed to estimate the
wedge between the pretax rate of return on a marginal investment project
and the posttax return on the savings made to finance the investment. We
analyze this tax wedge for three kinds of real assets, three industry
groups, three sources of finance, and three categories of owners, implying
eighty-one possible combinations of a hypothetical marginal investment.
The purpose of this section is to describe the construction of the weights
for these eighty-one combinations. These weights, in turn, are used for
the estimates of the weighted average marginal tax rates presented in
section 4.4.
4.3.1 Data Limitations
Data limitations prevented us from computing separate numbers for
more than thirty out of the eighty-one possible combinations. One ob-
vious reason for the seemingly modest achievement is the difficulty in
linking the real and financial activities of firms. We were forced to assume119 The Structure of the Capital Stock and Its Ownership
that, within an industry, investment in the three types of assets was
financed by debt, new share issues, and retained earnings in the same
proportions.
Another difficulty was to identify the beneficial owners of financial
securities in the different industries. We managed to produce rough
estimates of the shares of financial liabilities in the respective industries
held by each of the ownership groups, but we did not succeed in finding
industry-specific equity ownership data.
We distinguish between three industry groups: manufacturing, other
industry, and commerce. Restricting the analysis to these three industrial
sectors implies a restricted coverage of overall activity in the economy.
The three groups accounted for about 56 percent of total GDP in 1980, as
seen in row 4 of table 4.7. The table shows also the importance of the
public sector in Sweden. The "cost of production" in civil service depart-
ments, public authorities, and so on (government services, line 8) and the




a. Electricity, gas, water
b. Building and construction
c. Transport and storage
3. Commerce
a. Wholesale and retail trade
b. Other services
4. Total included industries
5. Excluded business sectors
a. Agriculture, forestry, fishing
b. Mining and quarrying
c. Restaurants and hotels
d. Communication (public)
e. Finance, insurance, real estate
6. Other domestic services, discrepancies
7. Total industry
a. Public enterprises
b. State business agencies
8. Government services


















































Source: National accounts of the Central Bureau of Statistics (SCB). Factor values exclude
indirect taxes but include subsidies, in current prices. Lines 7a and 7b are estimates from
annual reports of the included enterprises.120 Sweden
value added in publicly owned industry (lines 7a and 7b) together account
for approximately one-third of total value added.
We have also excluded from our study nationalized industries, enter-
prises where the public interest is predominant, and unincorporated
businesses. The implications of considering only the corporate sector are
illustrated in table 4.8 for the year 1979. From column 1 of this table, state
business agencies were excluded to obtain column 2. This adjustment
affects other industry particularly, because of the state-owned electricity
company (Vattenfall) and the railroad company (Statens Jarnvagar).
Second, legal forms of organization other than corporations were ex-
cluded to obtain column 3. These units—for example, family businesses
in the form of partnerships—are, as one could expect, most common in
wholesale and retail trade. Finally, we excluded state and local govern-
ment corporations—for example, the large holding company Statsfore-
tag. Summarizing the table, we see that the three industry groups defined
in our study account for no more than 38 percent of GDP (column 4, row
10). This limited coverage must be borne in mind when evaluating the
results presented in section 4.4.
The importance of confining the analysis to private corporations is
further demonstrated in table 4.9, which shows various characteristics of
the total business sector divided according to legal form of organization.
The table reveals the existence of substantial differences among the types
of organization. For example, public corporations invested three times
more than private corporations, as seen in the fifth row, but these
investments were internally financed to a much lesser extent than in
private industry (row 4). Nevertheless, the experience of private corpora-
tions (in column 3) was very similar to that for "all firms" (in column 1).
The corporate form has, in fact, strengthened its dominant position
during the past fifty years, as seen from table 4.10. The table reveals,
furthermore, a rather dramatic decrease in "individuals" (mainly single
proprietorships), from almost one-third of total operating income at the
beginning of the 1930s to about 10 percent in 1979.
Suitable data on capital stocks, sources of financial capital, and own-
ership of debt and equity for our three industry groups are not readily
available from official statistics. The numbers presented below are based
on information from a number of sources, of which the most important
was the annual publication Enterprises, Financial Accounts of the Central
Bureau of Statistics (SCB). Unfortunately, information of acceptable
quality on real capital stocks is not available from this source, and for this
reason we have used an additional classification scheme based on the
national accounts. Thus we have had to interface two partly separate
industrial classifications. Yet a third system of classifying business activity
is used in Financial Statistics of the SCB, an important source for tracingc 8
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Table 4.10 Distribution of Gross Operating Income by Legal Form
of Organization, All Industrial Sectors
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Source: The 1931, 1951, and 1972 Census of Enterprises and Enterprises, Financial
Accounts, 1979. The 1979 figures are not fully comparable with those for earlier years.
aNo data are available for individuals and state business agencies in 1979, so we use the same
share of gross operating income as for 1972.
the ownership of securities. Finally, we note that in some instances the
latest year for which data were available was 1979.
4.3.2 Capital Stock Weights
Net capital stocks are estimated for two reasons. First, with values for
real capital, financial assets, and debt we are able to determine debt/
equity ratios from the stock side, treating equity capital as a residual.
These ratios are then used in constructing weights for the different
sources of finance (section 4.3.3). Second, real capital stock figures are
required in order to estimate the distribution of assets among the three
industry groups. Our estimates of the proportions for machinery and
buildings are based on unpublished tables of net capital stocks from the
Central Bureau of Statistics (SCB). As described in section 4.2.4, the
SCB calculates these stocks using the perpetual-inventory method (see
also Cederblad 1971). The SCB estimates refer to activity as a whole and
are scaled down to the corporate sector using data on value added for
national accounts enterprises, on the one hand, and for private corpora-
tions on the other. Inventory values for nonfinancial private corporations
are obtained from Enterprises, Financial Accounts. These inventories
are valued according to certain legal rules and are normally not very
different from replacement cost values. The written-down book values
(for tax purposes) are, of course, much lower, as seen in section 4.2.3.
Table 4.11 shows the distribution of the corporate capital stock among
assets and industries in 1980. The corresponding matrix of the nine
asset-by-industry capital stocks and proportions is shown in table 4.12.
Two remarks should be made in connection with table 4.12. The first has
to do with the concept of inventories in the "building and construction"
part of other industry. As can be seen from the table, inventories con-
stitute a remarkably high share, more than 50 percent, of the capital124 Sweden
Table 4.11 Proportions of Nonfinancial Capital Stock by Asset
















Source: National accounts and Enterprises, Financial Accounts, and own calculations.
in that particular sector. This is, however, merely a reflection of the fact
that inventories include buildings either under construction or recently
completed but not yet sold.
The second remark concerns the rapidly growing use of leasing as a way
of expanding capacity. The SCB assigns such investments to the sector of
ownership (mainly financial companies). It should be noted, however,
that assets acquired by leasing in Sweden, in contrast to many other
countries (e.g., the United Kingdom), still seem to account for an insig-
nificant part of the total capital stock—less than 1 percent. There may,
however, be some potentially important tax advantages to leasing. For
example, a firm with positive taxable profits could purchase assets and
claim the 20 percent investment allowance (see section 4.2.5), then lease
the assets to firms with zero taxable profits. This could enable firms with
zero taxable profits to take advantage of the investment allowance. Since
1982 this particular arrangement can no longer be used. According to the
new rules, the investment allowance can be claimed only by the "final
users" of assets.
The alternative approach to measuring capital stock weights would be
to compute proportions using data on investment flows. To demonstrate
the differences between the stock and flow methods, we have put
together, in table 4.13, the resulting asset proportions for manufacturing,
had they instead been based on gross investments. As can be seen, the
pattern is much changed, with machinery receiving a larger weight. In a
steady-state situation with no net investment, we would expect this
outcome, since machines in general depreciate faster than buildings and
therefore have to be replaced sooner. The reader is referred to the
discussion of this point in chapter 2.
4.3.3 Sources of Financial Capital
To estimate market value debt/equity ratios, the following approach
was used. The first stage was to estimate the replacement cost value






























Source: National accounts and Enterprises, Financial Accounts, and own calculations.
aChanges in stocks of inventories.
replacement cost—and balance sheet data on financial assets and liabili-
ties together with our own calculations of the contingent tax liability
resulting from accelerated depreciation and inventory write-down, the
replacement cost value of equity was determined as a residual. Net trade
credit was excluded. In the second stage we estimated the market value of
equity using a sample of thirteen major engineering corporations (or
conglomerates), accounting for 40 percent of sales in manufacturing and
25 percent of the market value of the Stockholm Stock Exchange in 1980.
The ratio of market value to replacement cost (the "q ratio") for the
thirteen large corporations is shown in table 4.14. Our calculations indi-
cate that equity in 1960 had a market value very close to its estimated
replacement value. The "q ratio" fell to 0.6 in 1970 and further to 0.3 in
1980, reflecting the poor performance of the Swedish stock market.
These q ratios were assumed to be representative of the three industry
groups. The market values of equity were then computed as q times the
estimates of the replacement cost value of equity, using the 1970-80
average value of q equal to 0.51.
In judging this method for calculating the market value of equity, it
should be noted that, in view of the preferential tax treatment of capital
gains, it may be quite rational for a firm to undertake investments that
produce less than a dollar's worth of capital gains for the marginal dollar
of retention, leading to a value for q of less than unity (Bergstrdm and
Sodersten 1976). In equilibrium, shareholders would be indifferent be-
tween a dollar of dividends and (1 — m)/(l - z) dollars worth of capital
gains, if dividends were taxed at the rate m and (accrued) capital gains at
the rate z. For m - 0.409 and z — 0.096, representing weighted average
marginal tax rates for equity investors in 1980, this "marginal rate of
substitution of dividends for capital gains" takes the value of 0.65. This
analytically derived value for "marginal g" is well in line with the q ratios
appearing in table 4.14 for the first half of the 1970s.
The debt/equity ratio was estimated as the ratio of the market value of
debt to the market value of equity. For the former we used data on the127 The Structure of the Capital Stock and Its Ownership
























Source: Own calculations. The underlying capital stocks were constructed assuming a
geometric rate of depreciation of 5.4 percent, corresponding to the average rate for
machinery and buildings in manufacturing. See section 4.2.4. The last three years are
measured directly, and the preceding years are estimates. The corporations are: Alfa Laval,
ASEA, Atlas Copco, Bahco, Bulten-Kanthal, Electrolux, ESAB, Flaktfabriken, Ericsson
(LME), PLM, Saab-Scania, SKF, and Volvo.
Note: The q ratio is the ratio of market value to net worth.
book value of debt because very little debt is marketable. The market for
corporate bonds is rather thin in Sweden, and the share of bonds in total
net debt held by beneficial owners is less than 5 percent.
The division of equity finance between retained earnings and new share
issues was estimated from sources of funds data, and we used a three-year
average (1978-80). Since new share issues to acquire an existing company
{apportemissiori) do not constitute a source of net new finance, such
issues were excluded from our calculations. The three-year average was
necessary to prevent cyclical fluctuations in both retained earnings and
new issue activity from biasing the results. Table 4.15 summarizes the
result of this exercise. We were able to separate manufacturing in this
table but not able to distinguish commerce from other industry. Making
use of the data on identical enterprises with more than fifty employees in
1979 and 1980, we managed to extrapolate the 1979 data for private
corporations to 1980.
Finally, the shares of different sources of corporate finance were
obtained by adjusting both debt and equity for intermediate ownership.
The adjustment coefficients are given in sections 4.3.4 and 4.3.5, and the
final weights for the different sources of finance appear in table 4.16. The
first thing to notice from the table is that the proportion of total finance
from new share issues is, as in other countries, very small. Another
striking feature is the high degree of indebtedness in other industry and
commerce. The higher debt ratio in the former industry is explained by
the fact that buildings in progress, which are included in inventories in
table 4.12, are typically financed by short-term debt, and that inventories
make up a particularly large share of the net capital stock. This is
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Source: Own calculations as described in the text.
given in table 4.17. Long-term debt accounted for 66.8 percent of total
borrowing in manufacturing, but only 51.6 percent in commerce and 33.4
percent in other industry.
4.3.4 The Ownership of Equity
We would like to obtain ownership weights for equity that reflect
beneficial ownership—that is, intermediate holdings should be excluded.
There is unfortunately no information readily available about such in-
direct or nominee ownership. In table 4.18 the numbers showing the
distribution of owners in 1979/80 have therefore been obtained from
many different sources; the main source was a report to the Commission
on Wage-Earners Funds (Boman 1982), but substantial complementary
calculations of our own were necessary.
The major drawback of these ownership distributions is that they refer
only to shares quoted on the Stockholm Stock Exchange. Unquoted
Table 4.17 Maturity Structure of Private Corporate Debt
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Source: Own calculations based on unpublished data from the national accounts and
Enterprises, Financial Accounts.130 Sweden
Table 4.18 Shareownership in Sweden 1979/80 and
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Source: Boman (1982), Carlsson (1976), Spant (1979), Aktiv Placering, and own calcula-
tions.
shares are not included, since there are few data with which to determine
their ownership, and valuation is difficult in the absence of an active
market. If we assume that the relation between book and market values
for unquoted companies was the same as for quoted companies, then
these unlisted corporations would, as a group, have a market value
exceeding the value of all listed corporations by approximately 50 per-
cent. We also know that intermediate ownership is much larger for
unlisted companies. Roughly half the shares in these companies are
owned by other firms, and between 15 and 20 percent belong to the public
sector, leaving one-third to direct beneficial owners (compared with
two-thirds of the quoted shares, table 4.18). The lion's share of these
holdings is held by households, nonprofit bodies, and the like, rather than
by pension funds and insurance companies.131 The Structure of the Capital Stock and Its Ownership
If the ownership of these unquoted shares were included in our study, it
is quite plausible that the share of households would be larger than the 60
percent figure in table 4.18. Our calculations, however, are solely based
on the ownership of shares listed on the Stockholm Stock Exchange, the
only stock market in Sweden. Considering the relative smallness of this
market, we have not attempted to construct industry-specific ownership
proportions. Although the quoted sector accounts for roughly 40 percent
of all private corporate sales and an even larger share of gross profits, it is
heavily dominated by manufacturing, with few firms from industries such
as construction, transportation, and commerce.
In table 4.18 we see that the principal owner of equity is the household
sector, accounting for 60 percent of total beneficial ownership. There has,
however, been a significant downward trend in the fraction of equity
owned by households.
The decreasing household ownership has, of course, a counterpart in
the growing importance of institutions as shareholders. Classifying all but
households as institutions, we notice a ten percentage point increase
during the latter half of the 1970s for this group. The growth is especially
marked for government institutions (e.g., the AP fund explained below),
insurance companies, and tax-exempt institutions. Foreign ownership
has, on the other hand, stayed rather constant during the period. In 1981,
however, there was a marked increase in foreign investors' interest in the
Swedish stock market. This interest was partly due to the abolition in
1979 of some formal obstacles to "export" of Swedish shares, and for the
first time a surplus was registered for this type of portfolio investment in
the capital account.
Foreign ownership of Swedish industry is more important than indi-
cated by the stock-market figures of table 4.18, however. The reason for
this is that the greater part of foreign ownership is accounted for by direct
investment rather than by portfolio investment. Foreign investors' total
share of (beneficial) equity ownership in Sweden amounts to nearly 10
percent.
Investment companies, shown in the table as intermediate owners,
have held a fairly constant share of the ownership of listed corporations.
These Swedish investment trusts are of the "closed end" type—that is,
the share capital is not freely variable. A major feature of the investment
trusts from a tax point of view is that dividends are exempt from tax
provided at least 80 percent of the receipts are redistributed.
Table 4.18 shows that the beneficial owners included in our study
account for 63.2 percent of the total value of the Swedish stock market
(38.4 out of 60.8 BSEK). This share is the adjustment coefficient referred
to in section 4.3.3. It is used to adjust available data on new share issues
and retained earnings before estimating the shares of different sources of
corporate finance.132 Sweden
4.3.5 The Ownership of Debt
Table 4.19 shows the ownership of financial debt in our three sectors.
The estimates are based mainly on unpublished primary tables from
Enterprises, Financial Accounts (covering all enterprises with more than
fifty employees, industry by industry). The industry-specific parameters
for beneficial ownership of corporate debt are shown in the top half of the
table. Beneficial ownership accounts for 28, 29, and 40 percent of to-
tal debt in manufacturing, other industry, and commerce, respectively.
These proportions are the adjustment coefficients for debt used in section
4.3.3 to estimate the shares of different sources of finance.
In keeping with our general approach we exclude public ownership,
and hence the ownership weights calculated from the table exclude direct
government lending and "special government lending." "Special
lending" denotes the lending activities carried out by a number of finan-
Table 4.19 Liabilities of Swedish Enterprises, 1980,






































































































Source: Enterprises, Financial Accounts, and own calculations.133 Estimates of Effective Marginal Tax Rates
cial institutions funded via the state budget. These institutions provide
debt finance on terms that often are more favorable than those prevailing
in the regular capital market.
The National Supplementary Pension Plan (ATP) is by far the most
important scheme of occupational pensions in Sweden. The ATP plan,
enacted in 1960 and financed by employers' contributions, is basically a
"pay as you go" system where total contributions each year are supposed
to cover that year's pension payments. However, during the introductory
years of the system the rates of employer contributions were set by
Parliament at such a high level that a fund of considerable size was
created. There is no connection in the ATP plan between the size of this
fund (or its earnings) and the pension benefits. The idea behind creating a
fund during the period of introduction was rather "(i) to make possible a
gradual introduction of the plan without creating inequity between differ-
ent age groups, (ii) to compensate for an expected decline in private
insurance savings, (iii) to make possible a general increase in capital
formation without raising taxes and (iv) to enhance the ability of the
economy to fulfill pension commitments in a future with a greater number
of retired persons to be supported by the plan" (Bentzel and Berg 1983,
p. 169). Thus, the ATP plan may be schematically described as a "pay as
you go" system combined with a payroll tax that earmarks part of the
revenue for financial investment. These characteristics motivate the ex-
clusion of the ATP fund investments from our ownership weights.
Furthermore, we exclude "short-term financial debt" and foreign own-
ers from our ownership weights. Under the heading "short-term financial
debt" we include interfirm debt and value-added tax liabilities and in-
come taxes deducted at source but not yet paid to the government.
Finally, bank holdings of corporate debt—advances and bonds—have
been imputed to households, insurance companies, and other owners
according to the respective ownership categories' shares of total bank
deposits, regarding banks or financial intermediaries.
4.4 Estimates of Effective Marginal Tax Rates
This section presents the effective marginal tax rates on capital income
in the corporate sector in Sweden. It is organized in the following way.
Section 4.4.1 summarizes the results of the "base case," which represents
our best estimates of the parameter values for the tax system and for the
capital stock weights in 1980. As explained in earlier sections of this
chapter, however, some important changes in tax legislation, including a
new dividend tax credit system and a reduction in personal income tax
rates, have been made in recent years. In section 4.4.2 the effects of these
changes are analyzed. For comparison, calculations of effective tax rates
are presented also for 1960 and 1970 in section 4.4.3. Finally, in section
4.4.4 we present a comparison between calculations of effective marginal134 Sweden
tax rates and average tax rates on the return to capital invested in the
nonfinancial sector.
4.4.1 Principal Results
Table 4.20 shows the marginal effective tax rates on private nonfinan-
cial corporate investment in Sweden in 1980 for the fixed-p case in which
all assets earn a pretax real annual rate of return of 10 percent. Each
column of the table corresponds to a specific assumption about the
inflation rate. Three assumptions are explored—a zero rate of inflation,
the actual average rate of inflation of 9.4 percent experienced in 1971-80,
and a 10 percent rate of inflation.
The first three rows of the table show the marginal tax rates for
machinery, buildings, and inventories. These are average marginal tax
rates where the average has been taken over all industry groups, sources
of finance, and categories of owner.
The variation in effective tax rate by asset is striking. As far as invest-
ment in machinery is concerned, the present tax system approximates an
expenditure tax (equivalent to a zero tax rate on capital income). It is, in
fact, more favorable than an expenditure tax at a zero inflation rate,
providing a net subsidy to investment in machinery. For other assets the
tax rate is higher. With a fully indexed comprehensive income tax, the




























































35.6135 Estimates of Effective Marginal Tax Rates
marginal tax rates corresponding to table 4.20 would equal an average of
marginal income tax rates. In 1980 the average marginal income tax rate
of households (taken over debt and equity) was 57.3 percent, and apart
from investment in inventories when inflation is high, the present tax
system is more favorable than an income tax.
The differences in effective tax rates among the industry groups are
explained mainly by differences in the composition of their capital stock.
Inventories constitute twice as large a share of the total net capital stock
in other industry and commerce as in manufacturing, and inventory
investment is the most heavily taxed type of real investment. The average
allowed rate of inventory write-down is only 19.3 percent for other
industry compared with 60 percent for manufacturing and commerce, as
seen in section 4.2.3, and this contributes to the dispersion of tax rates.
The effective marginal tax rate differs markedly among the different
sources of finance. The relatively lower tax rates on debt finance are
explained by the combined effect of allowing companies to deduct the
nominal cost of debt and the fact that the average marginal income tax
rate on interest income is lower than that on dividends and capital gains.
New share issues constitute the most heavily taxed form of equity finance,
despite the special scheme to mitigate the "double taxation" of dividends
(see section 4.2.2).
There are dramatic differences in effective tax rates among the three
categories of owners. Investment financed by savings channeled through
tax-exempt institutions receives a substantial subsidy. The effective tax
rate of minus 51.8 percent means that for a 10 percent rate of return on
real investments undertaken by corporations, tax-exempt institutions
earn a posttax real rate of return of 15.2 percent on their savings. This
seemingly paradoxical result is explained by the interaction between
personal and corporate taxation and the fact that the corporate tax
system provides a subsidy to real investment.
The taxation of the return to savings channeled directly to companies
by households represents the case opposite to that of tax-exempt institu-
tions. At the inflation rate actually experienced in 1971-80, the wedge
between the pretax and posttax rates of return corresponds to more than
100 percent of the pretax rate of return.
The last row of table 4.20 shows the overall average marginal tax rates,
where the average is taken over source of finance, category of owner,
industry, and type of asset. At the actual rate of inflation in 1971-80, this
overall tax rate of 35.6 percent is considerably below the average mar-
ginal income tax rate of households of 57.3 percent.
On average, therefore, the present tax system is more favorable than a
comprehensive income tax, and at low rates of inflation it is closer to an
expenditure tax than to an income tax. An important difference between
the present system and either an expenditure tax or a comprehensive136 Sweden
income tax is, of course, the wide dispersion of effective tax rates around
the mean and their sensitivity to inflation. Both of these issues are
investigated further in chapter 7.
A comparison of the different columns of table 4.20 reveals the effects
of inflation on effective tax rates. The Swedish tax system is not indexed,
and it is often assumed that this causes the effective tax burden to rise as
the rate of inflation increases. This belief is, for Sweden, confirmed by
our study. An increase in the inflation rate from zero to 10 percent almost
triples the overall effective tax rate. Several factors combine to explain
this remarkable result. The real value of historical cost depreciation is
undermined by inflation, and FIFO accounting rules make corporations
pay tax on purely nominal capital gains on inventory holdings. Inflation
reduces also the real value of the special Swedish scheme to mitigate the
"double taxation" of dividends (the Annell deduction). Inflation in-
creases the nominal market interest rate, and the resulting increase in
nominal interest receipts is included with the income tax base of house-
holds and insurance companies. Insurance companies are further
affected by inflation because inflation reduces the real value of nominally
fixed deductions for reserves (see section 4.2.10). These tax-increasing
effects of inflation are partly offset by the fact that nominal interest costs
are fully deductible against the taxable income of corporations. This last
provision actually outweighs the taxation of nominal interest receipts to
investors, since the (effective) corporate tax rate, T, exceeds the personal
rate, m, averaged over investors. The difference between the two rates is
reduced by inflation, however, and the reason for this is that the effective
corporate tax rate is reduced by inflation (see section 4.2.5).
Tax-exempt institutions provide a striking exception to the rule that
inflation raises tax rates. In the "fixed-/?" case, we calculate the maximum
nominal rate of return the company can afford to pay on the financial
claims of investors. Under the Swedish corporate tax system, a ceteris
paribus increase in inflation leads to an increase in the real market yield
that can be paid to investors. For tax-exempt institutions this raises the
real rate of return on savings. For households and insurance companies,
however, the increase in real market yields is not enough to compensate
for the income taxation of the nominal returns to debt and equity.
It is interesting that inflation increases the dispersion of effective tax
rates dramatically. The tax differential between machinery and invento-
ries increases from 45 percentage points at zero inflation to 70 percentage
points at 10 percent inflation. Similarly, the tax differential between
households and tax-exempt institutions increases from 96 percentage
points at zero inflation to 161 percentage points at a 10 percent rate of
inflation.
The results for the "fixed-r" case are shown in table 4.21. By assuming
that the yield to investors before personal tax is the same for all invest-137 Estimates of Effective Marginal Tax Rates
































































ment projects, the tax rates obtained are in general higher than those in
the "fixed-p" case. The reasons for this difference were explained in
chapter 2. Note, however, that the variation in effective tax rates accord-
ing to asset, industry, source of finance, and category of owner is just as
true for the "fixed-r" case as for the "fixed-/?" case.
4.4.2 Recent Changes in Tax Legislation
Several changes in the taxation of investment income have been intro-
duced or proposed during the last few years. These include the so-called
tax savings scheme, the dividend tax credit introduced in 1981, and the
proposed "1985 system" of personal income taxation. The details of these
changes were presented in sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.8 above.
We consider first the "new rules of 1981," defined to include the tax
savings scheme and the dividend tax credit. They imply that (a) the
average marginal tax rate on the interest income of households is reduced
from 49.2 to 44.0 percent; (b) 6, the opportunity cost of retained earnings
in terms of dividends forgone, for households is raised from unity to 1.403
but remains at unity for institutional investors; (c) there is a minor
reduction in the statutory capital gains tax on households from 26 to 22
percent (arising from the tax savings scheme). Table 4.22 shows the138 Sweden
effects of these new rules for the "fixed-p" case. Their main effect is to
bring about a considerable reduction in the marginal effective tax rate on
savings channeled through new share issues. Depending on the rate of
inflation, the effective tax rate on new share issues is reduced by between
10 and 17 percentage points, making new share issues less heavily taxed
than retained earnings at zero inflation. New issues remain, however, the
most heavily taxed source of equity capital at higher rates of inflation
because the effect of the scheme to mitigate the double taxation of
dividends, the Annell deduction, is undermined by inflation (see section
4.2.2).
The 1981 "new rules" apply only to households, but the reduction in
the average effective marginal tax rate on households is small. Depending
on the rate of inflation, the reduction ranges from 3.5 to 6 percentage
points. The explanation for this limited effect on household taxation is, of
course, the relative unimportance of new share issues as a means of
channeling household savings into real investment.
A major reform of personal income taxation was decided upon by the
Swedish Parliament in June 1982 and is due to come into full effect in
1985. It implies a reduction in the average marginal income tax rate of
household equity investors from 64.0 percent in 1980 to 57.2 percent. The
statutory marginal tax rate on capital gains, which equals 40 percent of
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the marginal income tax rate, is therefore reduced from 26 to 23 percent.
The average marginal income tax rate of household investors' debt is cut
from 49.2 percent in 1980 to 43.3 percent, taking into account that 98.6
percent (see section 4.2.8) of household income on debt instruments is in
taxable form. The combination of the cut in the marginal income tax rate
of equity investors and the dividend tax credit system implies that the tax
discrimination variable 6 takes the value of 1.23 for household investors.
(The tax savings scheme is not considered part of the "1985 system.")
As shown in table 4.23, the 1985 rules reduce the overall average
effective tax rate at 10 percent inflation by no more than three percentage
points compared with the 1981 rules. Only household investors are
affected, however. Depending on the rate of inflation, their tax reduction
ranges from four to eight percentage points.
The third and final alternative considered in this section represents a
change in tax legislation of a different kind. We shall examine the effects
of abolishing the corporation income tax (and associated grants and
allowances). This represents an interesting case not only because the
abolition of the separate tax on corporate profits has been suggested in
Sweden as an alternative to tax reform, but also because it brings out
clearly the importance of the corporation tax for the results presented
above. Furthermore, in practice many Swedish corporations do not pay































































any corporation income tax as a result of the combination of low pretax
earnings and the existing extensive possibilities to reduce taxable profits.
Another important group of companies with low pretax earnings pay
corporation tax just sufficient to meet the requirement in Swedish law
that dividends be paid out of current or accumulated book profits (which
in turn are approximately equal to tax-accounting profits). For these
companies, an additional investment project may not affect total tax
payments, provided tax allowances on existing assets have not been fully
used. (For further discussion of this point, see section 4.4.4.) The effec-
tive marginal tax rates in the fixed-/? case for T = 0 and g = 0 appear in
table 4.24.
Comparing tables 4.24 and 4.20 makes it clear that eliminating the
corporate income tax would bring about a considerable increase in the
overall effective tax rate. The explanation for this increase is that the
range of tax concessions to investment is sufficiently great that taken
together they more than offset the effects of the tax. The required rate of
return on a project is a decreasing function of the corporate tax rate.
Readers looking for a full discussion of this point are referred to the
second part of Appendix C. In the case of debt finance, the effective tax
rate falls as the corporate tax rate rises if the tax allows full interest
deductibility and depreciation allowances beyond the value of true eco-
Table 4.24 Effective Marginal Tax Rates, Sweden,
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nomic depreciation. When interest payments are not deductible, the tax
rate falls only when allowances and grants for investment are worth more
than 100 percent first-year allowances (immediate expensing). The same
argument applies to equity finance, with the condition about deductibility
of interest payments replaced by a condition about the deductibility of
dividends (imputation credit). With immediate expensing and no imputa-
tion credit for dividends, the corporate tax reduces the net cost of
investment by the same proportion as it reduces the present value of the
earnings from the investment. Hence, when the tax system allows deduc-
tions that have a value greater than that implied by immediate expensing,
companies pay a negative tax on equity-financed marginal investments.
As shown in tables 4.24 and 4.20, abolishing the corporation tax would
result in a sharp rise in the effective tax rate on debt-financed invest-
ments. With the exception of the rate on new issue finance at zero
inflation, abolishing the corporate income tax would reduce the effective
tax rate on the return to equity-financed investment. This indicates that
the combined effect of the available deductions and grants on average is
less favorable than free depreciation. Inspection of the results for the
eighty-one individual combinations in Appendix B makes it clear, how-
ever, that the depreciation allowances for machinery in combination with
the 11.4 percent investment grant are more favorable to firms than free
depreciation. The corporation tax therefore provides a subsidy to mar-
ginal investments in machinery irrespective of the source of finance,
although it is a positive tax as far as other assets are concerned.
4.4.3 Comparison with 1960 and 1970
Promotion of industrial growth by means of generous investment in-
centives at the corporate level has been a paramount policy objective of
Swedish governments for more than two decades. During this period
there has been a rapid growth of total taxes, from 27 percent of GDP in
1960 to 41 percent in 1970, and to 50 percent in 1979 (see table 4.1 above).
It is particularly interesting to examine the changes over time in the
incentives to save and invest, as measured by the effective marginal tax
rates on capital income, in the light of this growing tax burden.
Brief accounts of the derivation of the parameter values for 1960 and
1970 were given in section 4.2. In 1960 Sweden had a classical system of
corporate taxation, whereas in 1970 some mitigation of double taxation
had been introduced through the Annell legislation. By 1980 the Annell
deduction had increased further. The rules of inventory valuation and of
fiscal depreciation of machinery have not been changed since the mid-
1950s, whereas for buildings an extra 2 percent allowance was introduced
in 1970. In 1960 investment in machines and buildings was taxed under
the sales tax at a rate equivalent to an investment grant of minus 2
percent. No investment grants were available in 1970, whereas in 1980142 Sweden
investment in machinery and buildings qualified for allowances equiva-
lent to investment grants of 11.4 percent and 5.7 percent, respectively.
The rules of the investment funds system (IF) were altered during the late
1970s, and the system was also put to more active use. At the margin, as
explained in section 4.2.5, the IF system effectively reduces the corporate
tax rate below the statutory tax rate. As a result, the effective corporate
tax rate (as defined in section 4.2.5 and assuming a 9.4 percent inflation
rate) was 37 percent in 1960, 41 percent in 1970, and 35 percent in 1980,
compared with the statutory corporate tax rates for the three years of 49,
53, and 57 percent. The statutory corporate tax rate increased over time
as a result of gradual increases in local income tax rates.
The 1960s and 1970s brought considerable increases in household tax
rates. The average marginal tax rates on household investors in debt and
equity rose from 34 and 45 percent in 1960, respectively, to 48 and 58
percent in 1970, and to 50 and 64 percent in 1980. Taxation of capital
gains on household shareholdings was introduced in the mid-1960s, and
by 1970 and 1980 the average marginal statutory tax rates had risen to 15
and 26 percent, respectively.
As a result of increases in local income tax rates, the marginal tax rate
on insurance companies (estimated at a 9.4 percent inflation rate) rose
from 24 percent in 1960 to 27 percent in 1970 and to 31 percent in 1980 for
investment in debt, whereas the marginal tax rate on dividends increased
from 17 percent in 1960 to 20 percent in 1970 and 24 percent in 1980.
Capital gains taxes were increased from 13 percent in 1960 to 15 percent
in 1970 and 19 percent in 1980.
The results of our calculations of effective marginal tax rates on capital
income in 1960 and 1970 are shown in tables 4.25 and 4.26. The combined
effect of the rising marginal tax rates on investors and of the more
generous investment incentives has been to leave the overall effective
marginal tax rate, at a 9.4 percent inflation rate, practically the same in
1980 as in 1960. The zero inflation effective tax rate was almost halved
between 1960 and 1980. A comparison between tables 4.25, 4.26, and
4.20 reveals, furthermore, that the effective tax rates rose between 1960
and 1970 and fell again between 1970 and 1980. This development is
explained by the fact that most of the increases of personal taxes occurred
between 1960 and 1970, whereas the reduction in corporation tax was
concentrated in the period 1970-80.
There are some noteworthy differences in the changes in effective tax
rates over time between the three categories of owners. For tax-exempt
institutions, the effective cuts in the corporation tax have brought about a
considerable reduction in the effective tax rate over time, whereas for
households the greater investment incentives have been insufficient to
counteract rising marginal tax rates. We note also that the tax discrimina-143 Estimates of Effective Marginal Tax Rates






























































tion against new share issues was more pronounced in 1960 than in 1980,
and the explanation for this is that in 1960 there was no mitigation of
double taxation. The variation in effective tax rate by asset was less
striking in 1960 and 1970 than in 1980. The main reason for this difference
is that the investment grants available in 1980, but not available in 1960
and 1970, favored investment in machinery over investment in buildings.
A final observation concerns the sensitivity to inflation of the effective
tax rates. Inflation causes the overall effective tax rate to rise for both
1960 and 1970, but the tax-increasing effects of inflation are less dramatic
than in 1980. While historical cost depreciation and FIFO accounting
rules provide explanations common to all three years for the increase in
effective tax rates with inflation, the differences in the sensitivity to
inflation are mainly explained by the fact that the purely nominal in-
creases in market yields to investors were taxed at lower rates in 1960 and
1970 than in 1980. It should be noted, finally, that for 1960 the effective
tax rate on the return to debt-financed investment falls as the rate of
inflation increases, whereas the opposite is true for both 1970 and 1980.
In 1960 the tax-reducing effect of deducting interest costs at the (effec-
tive) corporate tax rate of 37 percent outweighs the tax-increasing effect
of taxing nominal interest receipts to all three categories of owners.144 Sweden
































































4.4.4 Comparison with Average Tax Rates
It is of interest to compare the calculations of marginal effective tax
rates presented above with estimates of the average tax rates implied by
actual tax payments. The calculations presented in this section all refer to
the national accounts sector of nonfinancial enterprises. In addition to
our three industry groups (manufacturing, other industry, and com-
merce) the national accounts data also cover mining and quarrying,
agriculture, forestry and fishing, real estate, and business services. Public
business agencies (for example, the State Railway Company) as well as
other nonprivate and unincorporated enterprises are included. The
choice of the nonfinancial enterprises sector for our calculations has been
dictated by the lack of suitable alternative data.
The 1970s represented a period of dramatic change for the Swedish
economy. After the 1971-72 recession and the oil crisis of 1973, Swedish
firms—in particular manufacturing firms—experienced a boom in profits
of an intensity not witnessed since the Korean War. The subsequent
downturn, beginning in 1976, was equally dramatic, with the severest
profits crisis for manufacturing industry since the 1930s. Business condi-
tions improved again in 1979 and 1980, though profits remained low
compared with their previous long-term average. This is clearly reflected145 Estimates of Effective Marginal Tax Rates
in table 4.27, which shows corporate profits and their appropriation
among corporate taxes, interest payments, dividend payments, and re-
tained earnings. As a result of low profits, retained earnings net of
economic depreciation were negative in 1978-80. A significant feature of
the government's response to the difficulties facing business was large
subsidies to industry (Carlsson, Bergholm, and Lindberg 1981). This
policy, which included both rescue operations on a massive scale and ad
hoc investment subsidies, is reflected in the second row of table 4.27.
Corporate taxes of minus 2,078 million SEK are here defined as the sum
of corporate tax payments of 4,170 million and ad hoc subsidies of no less
than 6,248 million SEK. It should also be noted that, despite the down-
turn in profits, payments of corporation tax and payments of dividends
from the nonfinancial sector continued to increase in 1978-80 compared
with earlier years.
The average effective tax rate for the nonfinancial sector is defined
here as the ratio of total taxes on capital income originating in the sector
to real operating profits (net of economic depreciation). Its calculation is
summarized in table 4.28. Data on actual tax payments are available only
for the corporation tax. The actual amounts of income tax paid by the
owners of debt and equity on interest receipts and dividends cannot be
observed. Investment income is included with earned income for assess-
ment of tax, and it is not possible to determine whether investment
income comes "first" or "last." We have estimated tax payments on
interest receipts and dividends by simply multiplying the interest and
dividend payments of the sector by the weighted average marginal tax
rates on interest income and dividends, respectively, using the ownership
proportions presented in sections 4.3.4 and 4.3.5 as weights. The 1980
average marginal tax rates were 25.3 percent on interest income and 40.9
percent on dividend income.
Table 4.27 Corporate Profits and Their Appropriation, Sweden 1978-80
(billions of current Swedish crowns)
Real operating profits











Source: Own calculations based on National Accounts, 1980.
aNonfinancial firms pay dividends and interest on debt both to other firms within the same
sector and to recipients outside the sector. Firms likewise receive dividends and interest
earnings from both within and outside the sector. By interest payments we mean the sum of
all interest costs less the sum of all interest receipts. Dividend payments are defined
analogously.146 Sweden
Table 4.28 Average Tax Rate on Real Corporate Profits
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Source: Own calculations as described in the text.
Retained earnings are taxed as capital gains to the extent that profit
retention causes the market value of equity to rise. We assume here that
the tax rate on retained earnings can be approximated by the effective
rate of tax paid by the owners of equity on accrued capital gains.
As explained in section 4.2, the effective capital gains tax rate of
insurance companies is 19 percent, and for simplicity we have taken the
effective accruals tax (EAT) rate of households to be one-half the statu-
tory tax rate of 26 percent. This gives a weighted average tax rate on the
retained earnings of the nonfinancial sector of 9.6 percent.
The Swedish wealth tax is assessed on the net wealth (assets less
liabilities) of households, and there is no obvious way to allocate wealth
tax payments among various assets. It is possible, however, to obtain
rough estimates of the amounts of wealth taxes paid on account of the
holdings of equity and debt of nonfinancial enterprises. In his recent
study of household wealth, Spant (1979) gives a detailed account of the
distributions of financial and real assets of various kinds, as well as
household debt, over different size classes of net (taxable) wealth. This
information makes it possible to estimate the wealth tax payments of each
class, using the tax schedule presented in section 4.2.7. We then simply
assume that the wealth tax payments can be allocated proportionately147 Estimates of Effective Marginal Tax Rates
among the various assets of each class. If, for example, shares make up 30
percent of total assets of a specific class of net wealth, 30 percent of the
wealth tax payments of this class are allocated to the shares. This
approach is obviously equivalent to assuming that within a specific class
of net wealth assets of all kinds are financed by debt in the same propor-
tion.
Using this approach, we estimate that approximately 25 percent of
total wealth tax payments may be attributed to equity holdings and 13
percent to the ownership of bank deposits. Since only some 35 percent of
bank lending goes to the nonfinancial sector, we attribute only 5 percent
of total wealth tax payments to household ownership of debt. Hence, in
total, 30 percent of wealth tax payments are attributed to the nonfinancial
corporate sector, and the resulting 370 million SEK figure is shown in
table 4.28.
Our estimates of the average effective tax burden on capital income
from the nonfinancial sector appear in table 4.28. When the ad hoc
subsidies extended to the business sector during the crisis are treated as
negative taxes, the average tax rate turns out to be 29.4 percent. This is
six percentage points lower than the overall average marginal tax rate for
1980, at the actual average rate of inflation. If, on the other hand, the 6.2
billion SEK of subsidies are excluded, the average tax rate rises to 73.3
percent. Considering the very low level of business profits in 1978-80, it is
of interest to compare these numbers with corresponding figures for
earlier years. For 1973—the year preceding the profits boom of 1974-
75—we estimate the average effective tax rate to be 35.4 percent includ-
ing subsidies and 42.2 percent when ad hoc subsidies are excluded.
For the comparison with the results of section 4.4.1, however, there are
several observations to be made. As already pointed out, the tax rate in
table 4.28 reflects actual tax payments and profits associated with both
old and new assets held by firms, whereas the effective tax rates of section
4.4.1 refer to a set of hypothetical "marginal" investments. With a
corporate tax system that allows firms extensive possibilities to defer tax
payments through various schemes of accelerated depreciation, actual
tax payments and the share of profits paid as corporate income tax
become endogenous. They depend on the rate of growth of real invest-
ment and on the firms' (average) rate of return (see Sodersten 1975,
1978).
The theoretical calculations of effective tax rates in this study are all
based on the crucial assumption that corporations take full advantage of
depreciation allowances and rules of inventory undervaluation. This
implies either that the "representative" firm has sufficiently large profits,
or that the tax laws provide for full loss offset on "tax accounting" losses.
Empirical studies on a large number of Swedish firms indicate, however,
that most firms have not been able to fully use the existing extensive148 Sweden
possibilities to reduce or defer corporate tax payments. There is, in fact, a
strong correlation between the use of accelerated depreciation, and so
forth, and the (before-tax) rate of return of individual firms. As a result,
high-profit firms have a lower effective annual tax burden than low-profit
firms.
A possible explanation for this result is the combined effect of the
requirement of Swedish law that dividends be paid out of current or
accumulated book profits and of the close connection between book and
tax accounting profits. Within the limits set by tax legislation, Swedish
firms may themselves decide the size of the profits reported on the books,
through a more or less intensive use of accelerated depreciation, varia-
tions in the valuation of inventories, and allocations to investment funds.
If a policy of stable dividends is to be maintained, a firm with low
profitability may not be able to make full use of these possibilities of tax
deferral. This means the effective (annual) tax burden will be high in
comparison with a more profitable firm that is able to use all its tax
allowances.